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Abstract 
 
The late 2000s Global Financial Crisis swept the advanced world and spilled into the developing, 
creating chaos in its wake. At the crux of the crisis were the high-risk activities of investment banks in 
the developed world – and especially United Kingdom. Since then, academic and public discussion 
has revolved around the questionable relationship between investment banks and government that 
resulted in subpar regulation and the costly bank ‘bailouts’ of 2008 and 2009. What this thesis will to 
do is holistically assess how the power relationship between British investment banks and the United 
Kingdom government has evolved since the crisis, utilising Doris Fuchs’ Three Dimensional Approach 
to Business Power and Governance and a wide array of research to address those structural, 
instrumental and discursive elements of business power.  
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Introduction: Lifting the Shroud 
Government, Investment Banks and Power in Post Financial Crisis United Kingdom 
A critical deconstruction of the relationship between government and investment 
banks in the United Kingdom post global financial crisis (2007 – 2011) 
In 2007, the year of the global financial meltdown and the subsequent ‘bailout’ of the United 
Kingdom’s investment banks, protests targeted at both government and investment banks 
became commonplace in London. At the heart of this public outrage is the belief that the 
highly profitable investment banks who precipitated the crisis are the recipients of generous 
‘bailouts’, while austerity measures are reserved only for citizens.  This has called into 
question the nature of corporate power in the United Kingdom and the relationship 
between investment banks and government that created the regulatory vacuum which 
allowed the crisis to occur. This thesis seeks to assess how that power relationship between 
government and investment banks has evolved since the financial crisis.  
The Global Financial Crisis; Its Origins in Investment Banking and Regulative Governance  
 
The Global Financial Crisis of the late 2000s has been characterised by a crisis of confidence 
in the banking infrastructure that forms the backbone of the international capitalist system. 
The crisis, emanating from the collapse of mortgage backed securities in highly developed 
countries, has plunged the world into deepest global recession seen since World War Two 
(International Monetary Fund 2009). The locus of this crisis can be found in the activities of a 
few investment banks based in countries like the United Kingdom that conducted high risk 
activities in new, unregulated aspects of financial markets. This has led to a questioning of 
the power that investment banks have over government to maintain a permissive regulatory 
environment, and when faced with crisis, opt to provide bailouts of tremendous magnitude.  
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The most proximate cause of the Global Financial Crisis was the formation and 
trading of new unstable, mispriced and unregulated financial instruments by investment 
banks in the early to mid-2000s, which a wide spectrum of financial firms developed 
exposure to. This is consistent with the findings of investigations and reviews made by the 
United Kingdom’s chief regulator, the Financial Services Authority (Financial Services 
Authority 2009, 29 - 61), in addition to prominent economists Ben Bernanke (Bernanke 
2009), Joseph Stiglitz (Stiglitz 2009) and Edward Glaeser (Glaeser 2009), as well as 
institutions such as The International Monetary Fund (Claessons, et al. 2010, 4 - 7) and the 
Committee on Capital Markets Regulation (Commitee on Capital Markets Regulation 2009); 
a body comprising of many of the United States major academic business schools, think 
tanks and leaders, including Harvard University.  
Those financial instruments at the heart of the crisis include Collateralised Debt 
Obligations (CDOs), Credit Default Swaps (CDWs) and various other Asset Backed Securities. 
Collateralised Debt Obligations are formed from conglomerating many applications for credit 
to form a single investment opportunity in a specifically formed corporation or Special 
Purpose Vehicle (SPV). Investment banks form CDOs and then on-sell them to investors such 
as pension funds and retail banks (Select Committee on Economic Affairs 2009, 2 - 10).  The 
quality of CDOs were attested to by credit ratings agencies who’s function was to assess the 
aggregate ability of debtors to repay their loans. In the regulatory vacuum that existed 
however, there was no guarantee of the quality of CDOs and other asset backed securities, 
leading to highly rated bonds that in fact had a high probability of defaulting (Dowd 2009, 
141 - 166). The collapse of property prices and that ‘subprime debt’ proffered by investment 
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banks to investors and property buyers alike resulted in massive losses being recorded in a 
wide range of financial institutions, precipitating the complete financial meltdown  
Contributory factors to the financial crisis that were more endemic to the United 
Kingdom include British investment banks high reliance on capital flows with very little in the 
way of asset security (Refer to appendix a for further data). As the Turner Review reveals, 
British investment banks came to rely more and more upon high volumes of low-interest 
foreign capital in the years leading to the financial crisis (European Banking Authority 2011), 
they also engaged in more risky lending, with lower levels of collateral and capital reserves 
to fall back upon (Turner 2009). Adopting an ‘acquire and arbitrage’ model, in which the 
investment banks would purchase bulk credit from abroad to repackage and on sell to 
debtors, leading to a higher reliance on cheap capital streams that began to dry in 2007, 
precipitating the collapse of the Northern Rock bank almost immediately – creating further 
panic, leading to tighter credit, higher defaults and again, further panic (OECD, et al. 2008).  
While the proximate origins of the crisis are clear, the question remains as to why 
government regulators and lawmakers did not act to rectify this possibly catastrophic 
arrangement in the years leading to the Global Financial Crisis. In the United Kingdom, 
government nominated not to regulate new forms of financial trading, such as credit default 
swaps in a new and evolving futures market as well as sub-prime mortgage lending and the 
wholesale re-packaging and on sale of debt (OECD Publishing 2009, 101 - 121). The United 
Kingdom government also opted to not regulate the permissible level exposure to 
unregulated foreign markets and firms, preferring for a system of self-regulation (United 
Kingdom Stationary Office 2009, 215 - 220). This system has allowed for greater 
liberalisation and the integration of retail banks, or banks holding savings, with investment 
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banks that originally operated utilising investor funds (United Nations Development Program 
2009, 104) (Hunton 1991, 27 ) (Richardson and Livingston 2011, 36 - 44).  
It was this liberal attitude toward regulation, in addition to the stripping away of 
regulatory instruments as well as the resources and attention given to financial regulators 
that allowed the crisis to form unhindered (H.M Treasury 2011, 110 - 125) (Kawai and Prasad 
2011, 194 - 198). Since the crisis, literature and inquiries have abounded regarding the 
unhealthy relationship between investment banks and government leading to the financial 
crisis, as will be discussed in Chapter 2 in further detail. Studies by prominent British 
academic Adair Turner (Turner 2009) as well as publications by Klaus Schwab, Nouriel 
Roubini, and James Bilodeau decry this relationship as one of ‘regulatory capture’ wherein 
the investment banks held a vastly disproportional level of power over government’s 
principal enforcers (Schwaeb, Roubini and Bilodeau 2008, 44). David Miller describes this 
relationship as collusion between large investment banks and political actors (Miller 2011) 
that has had subpar outcomes for ordinary citizens. While the relationship between 
government and investment banks leading to the crisis is well documented, this thesis will 
assess how these power relations have evolved as a result of the financial collapse.  
A Profile of the United Kingdom  
 
This thesis will treat the United Kingdom as its principal case study, dissecting the power 
relationship between the British government and investment banks. While both the United 
Kingdom and the United States are credited as being the origins or ‘patient zero’ of the 
global financial crisis, the United Kingdom distinguishes itself by being, from 2002 – 2011, 
the most interconnected financial market in the world (Qatar Financial Centre Authority 
2011, 6). Whereas CDOs and other exotic financial instruments originated in the United 
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States, their spread is attributable in no small way to British financial institutions, which own 
over six trillion pounds worth of assets or four times the United Kingdom’s GDP 
internationally (Reuters 2011).   By purchasing and on-selling these new forms of debt, 
Britain’s investment banks spread the risk across the world.  
Furthermore, as the financial crisis originated in the United Kingdom, the impacts of 
the crisis have been felt earlier, and the subsequent regulatory response has also occurred 
faster. This includes the first major bank collapses and nationalisation that occurred in the 
United Kingdom (The Economist 2007), the first major plan to bail-out the financial industry 
instituted by the United Kingdom government (Warren 2009, 17), the largest singular largest 
bank bailout in the world (Aikins 2009, 25) and the first major attempts to re-structure 
financial regulation occurring in Britain (Falloon 2011). In of itself, the United Kingdom is 
worth of study due to its position as the largest financial centre in the world (MC WorldWide 
Insights 2011) (City of London, Yen 2009).  
The United Kingdom’s economy has been transformed over the past decade as a 
result of the investment banks it is home to. As a whole, the industry employs almost one 
million one hundred thousand employees with some one hundred and twenty thousand 
being directly employed by investment banks (Menon 2011). The growing significance of the 
sector is demonstrable in the increase from 10.3 per cent of total workforce in 2001 to 16.6 
per cent as of 2008 (The City UK 2011) (Casey 2011, 1 - 15), with more individuals being 
employed in ancillary industries. As a relative share of the United Kingdom’s economy, the 
financial industry constitutes close to fifteen per cent of GDP by the time of the crisis (Swain 
2008) with London being the world’s largest financial centre in the world (Busseire and 
Cassis 2005, 42).  
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The impact of the financial crisis in the United Kingdom has thus also been 
significant, with the three years of recession leading to negative economic growth of -2.1 per 
cent annually (Woo and Zhang 2010, 1) causing a 2.8 per cent increase in unemployment 
(OECD 2010, 1 - 3) and has seen tax revenue retreat almost twenty billion pounds (HM 
Treasury 2010) leading to harsh and unprecedented austerity measures (Nick Assander 
2010). 
Defining Investment banks and the British Regulatory System  
 
For the purpose of this thesis, an investment bank is a corporation or a subsidiary 
that primarily deals in financial services that engages in the brokerage of financial 
acquisitions and the formation of investment opportunities. Investment banks are the 
principle component in the packaging and trading of financial products such as Collateralised 
Debt Obligations (CDOs) as well as Credit Default Swaps (CDS); as aforementioned, it is 
within these unregulated markets that the global financial crisis originated (Sun, Stewart and 
Pollard 2010, 437 - 450).  
In the United Kingdom there are four investment banks, Lloyds of London, The Royal 
Bank of Scotland, Barclays Capital and HSBC, that comprise a seventy eight per cent market 
share (Office of Fair Trading 2011), while this thesis will not exclusively focus on those firms, 
it stands to reason that it will discuss their activities extensively. Other examples of banks 
with ‘commercial’ or investment banking subsidiaries based in the United Kingdom include 
Northern Rock and Gulf International Bank (UK) that were both involved in the formation of 
Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs) for the sale of collateralised debt obligations, credit default 
swaps and operated with very low capitalisation rates (Llewellyn 2009). 
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Government is more loosely defined in this thesis as a composite of political decision 
makers and regulators, both government appointed and quasi-independent. The United 
Kingdom until recently operated under a ‘tripartite system’ of financial regulation, in which 
the regulatory responsibilities were defused between The Financial Services Authority (FSA), 
The Bank of England (BOE) and Her Majesty’s Treasury (HM Treasury). The general division 
of duties charged the FSA with consumer protection from misleading or predatory financial 
products as well as complete prudential overview of investment banks to stem high-risk or 
fraudulent activities. The Bank of England in turn is charged with managing the macro-
economic stability of credit markets while HM Treasury is responsible for assessing and 
funding interventions into the economy, if required (C. Goodhart 2008) (Hodson and Mabbet 
2009).  
In this system the principal regulator of investment banks is the FSA, operating under 
the powers and obligations of the Financial Services and Markets Act (2000). As the peak 
organisation charged with regulatory purview over investment banking, it was the FSA that 
prosecuted financial crime and misleading or predatorily activity, such as the knowing sale of 
‘junk’ CDOs by investment banks. An accusation often charged against the Authority is it 
failed in flagging the insolvency of the Northern Rock bank, and also failed to notice the on 
sale of junk credit and sub-prime mortgages by investment banks.  In June 2011 the Financial 
Services Authority was effectively disbanded, with its duties and powers dispersed amongst 
other regulators or vested in the Bank of England. This highlights the important role of 
legislators in defining, creating and empowering regulation and regulators, who along with 
their political parties, will be studied in this thesis.  
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Chapter 2: Conceptions of Business Power and Governance 
 
This thesis seeks to analyse and deconstruct the power relationship between the United 
Kingdom’s government, and its investment banks. Therefore it is fundamentally a question 
of business power and governance and the nature of public and private authority. As such it 
is important to establish a conceptual framework to address these issues that is appropriate 
for studying the relationship between investment banks and government in the United 
Kingdom. This chapter will outline the debate regarding the suitable approach to these 
questions and establish the methodology used throughout this thesis. Through this, the 
significance and place of this paper within existing academic discourse can be established.  
 
A Framework of Study 
  
“While global banking institutions are global in life, they are national in death.”  
- Mervyn King, Governor of the Bank of England 
 
The first issue to recognise is whether questions of government and business 
relations are fundamentally dealt with on a national basis or international basis. While 
international treaties and frameworks may be regarded as important, as Charles Goodhart 
(Goodhart 2009)and Joseph Stiglitz (Stiglitz 2001)argue - issues of financial regulation are still 
derived from national authority and thus emanate from them. It is important to note that in 
the early 1980s, the United Kingdom embarked on unilateral deregulation of the financial 
industry – a decision made at a national level, though with international consequences. 
While negotiations are ongoing to find some form of agreement and harmonisation between 
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states on financial regulation, with the third round of talks in Basel (Tarullo 2009), it must be 
acknowledged that the diplomatic positions of varying countries emanate from national 
institutions and goals. Often, as Deborah Avant, Martha Finnermore and Susan Sell argue, 
international organisations and bodies or ‘global governors’ enhance state power rather 
than supersede it, with “different states join with different (global) governors depending on 
the respective goals and constituencies of each” (Sell, Finnemore and Avant 2010, 357). The 
stance on financial regulation taken by the United Kingdom’s government will originate from 
the interplay of public and private institutions within the bounds of the nation state. As such, 
this thesis remains fundamentally one framed in the national context of power relations 
between Britain’s investment banks and government and how this relationship is 
constructed and evolving.    
Private and Public Authority – The Myth of the Powerless State  
 
While this paper will fundamentally address issues regarding business power in government, 
this issue also touches on issues of public and private authority, of which there is a broad 
academic discourse (Hay, Marsh and Lister 2006). The following section will address a variety 
of views regarding the nature of the state and national institutions, as well as the future of 
the regulatory state.  
 As L. Weiss terms it, ‘globalist’ orthodoxy exists in some academic circles, positing 
that the interventionist state is an artefact of the past. At the crux of this argument is ‘the 
triumph of the market’ wherein a combination of technological advances has allowed 
globalisation to render nations powerless in the face of transnational corporations and non-
governmental organisations. As Desmonde McNeil, Benedicte Bull (Bull and McNeil 2007) 
and Michael Parenti (Parenti 2009) argue a view popularised by the likes of Martin Wolf and 
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Thomas Friedman that nation states are engaging in a new post-cold war order, as the free 
flow of capital, trade and knowledge reward localities that minimise ‘intrusive’ government 
behaviour (Friedman 1999) (Wolf 2004). Andrew Baker, David Hudson and Richard 
Woodward further argue that the financial industry is at the forefront of this transition from 
state authority, as the ability to move capital between national boundaries restricts the 
capacity of any individual state to act (Baker, Hudson and Woodward 2005, 13).   
 This is the ‘Myth of the Powerless State’ described by Linda Weiss, in which the role 
of the state, and national institutions, is under acknowledged when analysing business 
power, governance and globalisation (Weiss 1998) (Weiss 2000). To discuss the financial 
industry in particular, analysis by Allen Berger (Berger, Deyoung, et al. 2000) of two 
thousand ‘multinational’ banks and their affiliates tends to reinforce the notion that national 
institutions matter. Each of the multinational firms often adopted a ‘nationality’ 
independent of its global operations that “strongly influenced” its activities as well as 
extensively interacting with the government of their ‘base country’ (Berger, Dei, et al. 2002).  
This is consistent with the argument made by John Mikler regarding national institutional 
variance being an important element of business behaviour and regulatory outcomes (Mikler 
2009, 14 - 40). While acknowledging that often government may opt to delegate the 
authority of regulating to independent organisations, to the private sector or to 
international organisations, Louis Pauly argues that underpinning this behaviour is 
“legitimate public authority” that in crisis will “reassert their ultimate regulatory power” 
(Pauly 2002). Douglass North, Stephen Weingast and Barry Haber deconstruct in greater 
detail how the interplay between national institutions, specifically government structure, 
and its banking sector tends to define the competitiveness of the industry (North, Weingast 
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and Haber 2007). This type of analysis trends to reinforce the importance of the interplay 
between national actors, particularly the state and private sector actors, as well as 
institutional legacies in shaping the nature of regulation as well as public and private 
authority. 
 
 The Regulatory State in the 21
st
 Century and Normative Constructions of Legitimacy  
 
 John Braithwaite, Edward Glaisser, Andrei Shleifer and Steven Vogel have argued that 
a new ‘regulatory’ state has emerged in the United Kingdom, as well as in other countries in 
the past twenty five years (Braithewaite 2000) (Glaeser and Shleifer 2001) (Vogel 1996). At 
the crux of their argument is that the ‘liberalisation’ of markets has created more regulation, 
not less, in which government and society feels increasingly compelled to place limitations 
on the activities of business. While there is an observable shift from the centralised model of 
regulation and enforcement, behaviour that is compliant with institutional norms and 
socially specific customs is expected from industry, and when faced with non-compliance, 
regulators will tend to enforce those norms through both punitive measures and rewards.  
Though the state may intervene less often and less directly than in the 1950s – 1970s, there 
are more rules for business to comply with to mitigate the societal risks of globalisation. 
When analysing investment banks and government in the United Kingdom it is therefore 
important to acknowledge that both actors compete within an environment defined by long-
held institutional and normative practices. This competition is one over legitimacy and 
power in regulation within a normatively constructed framework of the appropriate roles of 
government and business (Moran 2001).  
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  In a more practical sense, the new regulatory state has brought with it a number of 
changes in the nature of regulation. As Timothy Sinclair argues (Sinclair 1999), business is 
often left to self-regulate and govern when their activities are acquiescent with wider 
societal norms. In the financial industry, up till the meltdown, inter-firm co-ordination in the 
form of rules and procedures such as independent bond rating agencies and accounting 
practices formed the crux of much of this apparent self-regulation. Bridget Hutter further 
notes that with the increased sophistication and specialisation of business due to 
globalisation, allowing for self-governance and so called ‘regulation of industry regulation’ 
has become increasingly attractive for national governments (Hutter 2006). Many examples 
exist of this behaviour, as surmised by Viriginia Haufler and Sinclair (Haufler 2001) (Sinclair 
2001) in which regulation is delegated to the private sector.  
 While business has evolved to strip government of legitimacy by engaging in self-
regulation and inter-firm co-operation, the state has also evolved to delegate authority to 
quasi-independent regulators and other bodies to reaffirm its capabilities while shying from 
the previous hierarchical model of regulation (Borzel and Riesse 2002). Examples of this in 
the United Kingdom are outlined and discussed by the likes of Iain McLean, Fabrizio Gilardi 
and Colin Scott (Gilardi 2004) (McLean 2004) (Scott 2004), including the creation of a quasi-
independent central bank and prudential regulation, the Financial Services Authority. More 
importantly, at the crux of these developments is a struggle for power and legitimacy in the 
eyes of society in conforming to broader institutions of behaviour. 
Fuchs’ Three Dimensional Analysis of the Power of Business in Governance  
 
Doris Fuchs’ Business Power in Global Governance (2007) provides important insights into 
the nature of government business relations and provides an effective and comprehensive 
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framework to analyse the relationship between the financial industry and government 
regulation. Fuchs’ work is principally in response to a wave of academia claiming that in the 
era of globalisation, authority has been increasingly vested in the hands of a few powerful 
transnational corporations. These bodies, described as “extremely powerful actors”, like 
large financial firms and conglomerates, are reported to have “increasingly been able to 
shape governance” (Fuchs 2007) by the likes of Philipp Muller (Muller 2002), Claire Cutler, 
Virginia Haufler and Tony Porter (Cutler, Haufler and Porter 1999). 
In response to this, Fuchs proposes that any model of studying the relationship between 
government and business that conforms to two key requirements  
a) That it form a systematic and comprehensive framework of locating the various 
political activities of business in global governance within the context of power 
relations 
b) It applies this framework to evidence on trends in respective political activities  
 The basic principal of this model is that the activities of business can be perceived 
through the lenses of power relations and in this, effectively assessed. It provides a useful 
framework of analysis for a question that is fundamentally relating to the power relations 
between government and business and the exact nature of those relations, it is important to 
note that Fuchs has earlier utilised it in an analysis of the power of the German finance 
industry (Fuchs and Graf 2010). At the crux of it, Fuchs’ book is fundamentally a model on 
the nature of business and government power, how to perceive it, interpret it and effectively 
assess it. It lends itself inherently to an analysis of government-business power and their 
strategic interplay. Beyond this, as it separates the different forms and sources of power, it 
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then is easy to distinguish between what is important or significant, and what is not. In 
analysing the evolution of the relationship between investment banks and government 
regulations, and the relative decline in private power, this model offers an in-depth and 
sectionalised mode of analysis.  
 To this end, Fuchs surmises the three different approaches toward power, 
instrumentalist, structuralist and discursive. In its simplest form, an instrumental approach 
toward power, as proposed by Jeffrey Berry and other instrumentalists (Berry 1997), is the 
study of the locus of power, the intent, cause and effect of actions is the basic focus of 
analysis. A structuralist approach to power, as discussed by Ronen Palan (Palan 1992), John 
Braithwaite and Peter Drahos (Braithwaite and Drahos 2000) attempts to bridge the short-
comings of instrumentalism by taking into account the material structures that come to 
shape the agenda of policy options and determining directly and indirectly decision making.  
Discursive power as, proposed by Darrell West and Burdett Loomis (West and Burdett 1999), 
and proposed as the third dimension by Fuchs, is looking at those institutional and 
normative biases that frame entire discussions and the policy arena in which both problems 
and solutions are perceived. 
  It is important to note that discursive power is closely tied to legitimacy. This is a 
critical factor in issues related to public and private authority that will also discussed in this 
paper. As Arendt (Aredt 1970) and Hans-Jurgen Bieling (Bieling 2007)argue, while power, 
authority and legitimacy are heavily interlinked, they do not occur in that order of 
progression. In addressing questions of private and public authority it then becomes 
important to fully understand how private firms in the globalised world have pressed to 
redefining legitimate authority and the perceived boundaries of government power. This is 
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especially important in relation to the study of financial firms and government regulatory 
bodies. With this being said, when addressing the relationship between government and the 
financial industry, one observe the use of direct lobbying and increasingly complex forms of 
structural power in affecting policy decisions.  
 Fuchs also outlines how business uses these different forms of power in a more 
direct manner. While instrumentally business uses lobbying amongst a wide array of very 
direct interventions to effect policy change, they also utilise their structural power. This is 
the use of economic structure such as the ability to direct jobs or investment (or threaten to 
do so) to reward or punish government decisions, as well as new forms of political activities 
such as rating and standard setting that is effect, quasi-regulating the global financial 
markets. Finally Fuchs also discusses how business may opt to drive discursive power by 
defining and delineating zones of public and private authority, this is important and is 
discussed in a wide range of literature. In effect this determines what is perceived as 
legitimate public and private action in arguably restricts the scope of national governance.   
 While other authors and texts mentioned assist with studying this topic in a more 
theoretical sense, Fuchs provides a highly practical model to analysing the relationship 
between business and government in the era of globalisation. It is Fuchs model that informs 
for the large part, the methodology outlined in later sections of this paper. Consistent with 
the model put forward by Fuchs, this paper is divided into three chapters, outlining in 
greater detail the Structural (Chapter 3), Instrumental (Chapter 4) and Discursive (Chapter 5) 
elements of the power relationship between the United Kingdom’s government and 
investment banks.  
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 In Chapter 3: The Structural Power of Investment Banks this thesis will look at 
a wide array of economic indicators to understand whether the structural 
significance of the industry to the United Kingdom as a whole has increased or 
decreased. This takes into account issues of tax revenue, export earnings, 
labour force engagement and addresses issues to do with industry support in 
the post-crisis era.  
 Chapter 4: The Instrumental Power of Investment Banks will look in depth at 
the direct influence investment banks exert over regulators and decisions 
makers. This chapter takes a two pronged approach toward this issue, first 
addressing investment banking’s power over regulators and then, through the 
analysis of political donations, statements, interviews and lobbyists 
behaviour, questions the sway investment banks have over decision makers in 
the United Kingdom.  
 Chapter 5: The Discursive Power of Investment Banks finally looks at the 
perceived legitimacy of investment banks in British society. Initially 
documenting attempts by investment banks to influence public discourse, this 
chapter goes on to take measures of the evolving discourse produced by 
senior politicians and regulators, and then analyses newspapers and polling 
data, the changes in investment banks discursive strength.  
Contributions of this Thesis  
 
This paper aims to contribute to existing academic discourse through analysing the most 
recent developments in the relationship between the United Kingdom’s government and 
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investment banks, whilst also utilising Fuchs model of business power and governance to 
build on contemporary understandings of public and private authority.  
 Since the Global Financial Crisis there have been several academic reviews regarding 
the relationship between government and investment banks in the United Kingdom, leading 
to the financial crisis. The Turner Review (Turner 2009, 117) conducted by Adair Turner 
stands out as one of the seminal and most comprehensive works in this area. The review 
addresses issues to do with the relationship between government and investment banks, 
and especially identifies major problems with Britain’s regulatory system and the influence 
investment banks have had over policy makers and regulators. Former Bank of England and 
Financial Services Authority economists, Howard Davies and David Green have also written 
extensively on this relationship (Davies and Green 2008), as too have Steven Aikins, Irvine 
Lapsley and Wim Naude that arise at similar conclusions to the Turner Review’s criticisms of 
government-business relations (Aikins 2009) (Lapsley 2010) (Naude 2011). What this thesis 
seeks to address is how or whether this power relationship between government and 
investment banks has changed since the Global Financial Crisis. In this manner, this thesis 
contributes a fundamentally new element to the existing public discourse.  
 Further, this thesis will apply Fuchs Three Dimensional Model of Business Power 
and Governance to a practical setting. Fuchs has already utilised this model to analyse the 
relationship between government and the banking industry in Germany, this thesis will 
extend this form of analysis to the United Kingdom. This analysis will also have potential 
therefore to contribute to contemporary understandings of private and public authority and 
the notion of the regulatory state by deconstructing in depth, the relationship between 
government and a particular sectoral interest.  
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Chapter 3: The Structural Power of Investment Banking 
 
Structural power is not a force that must be wielded by business to influence government 
and change the nature of regulatory debate. Rather, structural power is constituted by the 
economic conditions that influence government decision making; it can either enhance or 
diminish the relative power of business when dealing with government. The structural 
power of investment banks in the United Kingdom lie with the sectors economic significance 
as a driver of growth, its level of labour force engagement as a major employer and its 
supposed mobility over state boundaries, which theoretically allows the industry to reward 
and punish government. Throughout the early 2000s the economies of both London and the 
United Kingdom developed a structural dependency on the employment, bonuses, export 
earnings and tax revenue generated by the industry. The structural importance of the sector 
to the economy as a whole served to encouraged and reinforce lax regulations as well as a 
national framework that viewed investment banking as integral to Britain’s future. The 
following chapter will document whether and how this structural economic power has 
evolved since the Global Financial Crisis, as is it assists in forming a greater understanding of 
how the power relationship between government and investment banks has transformed 
due to the crisis.  
Economic Costs and Benefits - Growth, Exports, Tax Revenue and Subsidies  
 
With the decline of manufacturing as an effective base of export earnings and tax revenue 
(Gardiner and Mathews 2000, 210 - 230) (Cairncross 1996, 219 - 230), the government of the 
United Kingdom has looked to develop other industries, particularly in the tertiary services 
sector, to drive growth and form new tax base. Investment banking has filled this void as a 
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chief export earner and driver of economic growth. This section will detail whether the 
structural power of investment banks have increased or decreased since the Global Financial 
Crisis by analysing key economic indicators regarding the importance of the industry  in 
driving growth, export earnings and forming tax base. This section will also discuss the 
industry support provided by the government due to the crisis and its impact on investment 
bank’s structural power.  
As of 2010, financial services constituted twenty per cent of the United Kingdom’s 
exports, valued at forty one billion pounds or four per cent of gross domestic product (Office 
of National Statistics, Bank of England 2010), with investment banking accounting for more 
close to ninety per cent of this and the lion’s share of all financial services (LMI Research 
2007). This constitutes a significant and sector of the United Kingdom’s overall economy. 
From 2008 - 2009 investment banks saw a seventeen per cent reduction in their overall 
export earnings (Office of National Statistics, Bank of England 2009), dropping to forty one 
billion pounds a year from heights of over fifty billion annually. While this may suggest the 
economic significance of banks have declined, this is misleading, as while growth has been 
arrested from 2006 peak levels, investment banks export earnings have remained steady 
when compared to 2007 and  are higher than any year in the past decade (Office of National 
Statistics, Bank of England 2011). This is contrary to reporting in financial papers of repute 
such as Bloomberg, The Financial times and the Wall Street Journal argue investment banks 
and the financial sector have declined as a result of the crisis (Bloomberg USA 2011) 
(Financial Times 2011) (Wall Street Journal 2010). While these papers appear to report a 
decline in the economic significance and therefore, structural power of investment banks, 
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they do not account for the growth of the industry’s relative economic size, or even absolute 
profitability within the United Kingdom. 
Investment bank’s relative share of gross domestic product, as opposed to absolute 
size, has not in fact declined; rather it has increased over the past five years, while 
investment bank’s share of export earnings has also remained relatively stable when 
accounting the 2008Q2 to 2009Q2 decline of the United Kingdom’s services exports at minus 
seven point one per cent,  goods exports at minus sixteen point nine per cent and an overall 
export decrease of twelve point nine per cent nationwide (Ernest & Young 2011, 5). When 
investment banks export earnings are compared to the overall decline in the service export 
sector as displayed in Figure 1, and as noted in August 2010 by The Telegraph, rather than 
being in decline, the investment banks are integral to, and leading the recovery in the United 
Kingdom (Sibun 2010). This trend is not expected to change; the Office of National Statistics 
and Cambridge University predicts that financial services will grow to account for forty per 
cent of national output by 2020, increasing by one per cent of national output annually 
throughout the global financial crisis (Office of National Statistics 2010). While new growth 
has focused disproportionately on insurance firms, at least half of growth in the financial 
sector is expected to originate in investment banking (Office of National Statistics, Bank of 
England 2011, Table 1). The relative economic size and export potential of the United 
Kingdom’s investment banks has either remained steady or increased when compared 
growth rates for any year prior to 2006.  
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Figure 1. Investment Bank Exports in billions of pounds (blue) and as a percentage of trade service exports (Red) showing 
an increase in profits from 2005/6 levels and steady share of overall service export earnings over the 2007/08 GFC period 
With the continued growth of the financial sector in the United Kingdom and a 
relative increase in their economic importance, the tax revenue generated from this 
industry, and likewise the dependency of government on the proceeds of the financial 
sector, have also increased. In 2010 eleven cents in every dollar of government tax revenue, 
or fifty three billion pounds, was generated from the financial services sector 
(PriceWaterhouseCooper 2010, 2), this share of tax base is only expected to grow by HM 
Treasury, which predict six per cent growth from this sector in both short and long term tax 
projections (Office of Budget Responsibility 2011, 2). When compared to other G20 
countries, the United Kingdom ranks from first to forth highest on the percentage of total 
tax revenue collected from the financial industry, in the worst of times (International 
Monetary Fund 2010, 69). Iaona Petrescu estimates that the United Kingdom’s reliance on 
this revenue stream outstrips almost every other country in the world (Petrescu 2011, 2 - 20) 
with the industry being the largest singular source of tax revenue for government in 2010 
(The City of London Corporation 2010). Further, the expectation that the economic centricity 
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of investment banking is set to grow is reflected urban planning decisions regarding growth 
centres in Edinburgh (First Minister's Office 2008) and Leeds (University of Leeds 2009), that 
the UK government expects to become minor financial hubs, as well as allowances made for 
unprecedented development of investment banking office space within ‘The City’ in London 
as reflected in urban plans (Skidmore, Owings, Merrill lty 2007). These decisions suggest that 
the central nature of investment banks to the United Kingdom’s economy is only expected to 
grow with time.  
In summation the United Kingdom’s investment banks have increased in their 
economic significance since the global financial crisis. Key indicators such as export earnings, 
proportion of GDP and percentage of national output indicate that investment banks have 
increased in significance for economic growth and future prosperity. While the United 
Kingdom’s economy has flagged in several major sectors, investment banks have relatively 
increasing their share of tax contributions and export earnings. When discussing the 
structural economic power of investment banks, it is important to keep in mind the financial 
rescue package of 2007 -08, and the possible negative impacts this could have had on the 
structural power of investment banks.  
Bailing out the Banks  
Any discussion of the structural power of 
investment banks, and especially the 
economic benefits brought by the 
industry, would be disingenuous if it did 
not account for the 2007 financial rescue 
package by the United Kingdom 
Figure 2. Asset Protection Scheme by Component 
28 
 
government in response to the global financial crisis. To outline the package in brief, it 
provided upwards of one thousand, two hundred and twenty billion pounds worth of 
support to the British financial industry (HM Treasury 2008) and specifically those 
investment arms that had become overly exposed to high-risk markets that were at risk of 
defaulting during the global financial crisis. This package also involved conditions aimed at 
increasing lending and liquidity in the market through government guarantees and credit 
(Osbourne and Darling 2008). From the perspective of government, the package constituted 
a major intervention in the economy. In 2010, public sector net debt was nine hundred and 
forty four billion pounds or sixty two per cent of GDP, a level consistent with European 
sovereign debt standards1 as outlined in the European Council Stability and Growth Pact 
(Council of the European Union 2011, 60). When debt accrued from the financial rescue 
package is included, encompassing the debt obligations of now public corporations the Royal 
Bank of Scotland Group and Lloyds Banking Group, the national public debt liability rises to 
two thousand two hundred and fifty two billion pounds or one hundred and forty nine per 
cent of gross domestic product (Office of National Statistics 2011). This figure does not 
include five hundred billion dollars in liabilities from the underwriting of mortgage securities 
(Economics.co.uk 2011). This program constitutes the largest insurance policy ever written 
(Downing 2011, 162) and its total possible cost is greater than the entire 2009 budget (HM 
Treasury 2009, 39).  
Superficially it would appear that the United Kingdom’s government rescue package 
was at a tremendous public cost, with a bailout of the UK’s key financial institutions and 
especially investment banks that engaged in overly risky investment practices. Upon further 
                                                           
1
 This Pan-European pact is an agreement to generally limit annual deficits to within three to six per cent of 
gross domestic product and overall deficits to below sixty per cent of GDP 
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examination however, the Bank Rescue Package constitutes a massive investment and 
underwriting of investment banks by the United Kingdom government. Whilst the United 
States Troubled Assets Relief Program effectively bought underperforming assets from banks 
for well above market value, the United Kingdom’s plan has followed the Swedish model2 
(Fratiani and Marchione 2010), by investing directly into banks and underwriting their assets. 
As such, the dynamics of the British rescue package are also different, as the government’s 
liability rests not with the performance of troubled assets, but rather with the investment 
banks themselves. A primary example of this is the five hundred and eighty five billion pound 
Asset Protection Scheme under which the United Kingdom government has insured banks 
against losses from their most risky assets (HM Treasury 2009). Bank debt guarantees work 
in a similar manner, wherein government has underwritten the credit lent to banks, in effect 
accepting final liability for those loans.   
What these programs, and the direct purchase of investment banks Royal Bank of 
Scotland Group and Lloyds, have in common is that they have increased the United 
Kingdom’s direct expose to the performance of investment banks. By insuring investment 
banks against losses while purchasing stakes in their holdings and lending two hundred 
billion pounds in the Special Liquidity Scheme (Downling 2008), the United Kingdom 
government’s net debt and earnings are now intricately linked with the performance of key 
investment banks. While it is entirely possible that much like the Troubled Assets Relief 
Program (TARP) in the United States (Congressional Budget Office 2010, 9 - 13), the United 
Kingdom’s rescue package may indeed turn a profit, this, however is contingent on the 
performance of investment banks over a period that may extend up to a decade or more. In 
                                                           
2
 The Swedish Model as explained by Fratiani and Marchiani is a bank bailout that expects investment banks to 
take large write downs on troubled assets before government intervention and allows for direct government 
ownership of banks  
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reality, while it may appear that the bank rescue package has dented the structural 
economic power of investment banks, rather, it has made government and society even 
more vested in the profitability and health of British investment banks.  In this manner, the 
structural power of investment banks has grown, as the economic performance of 
investment banks more directly affects government as a shareholder and a stakeholder.   
Job Creation and Labour Market Engagement  
 
Contemporary economists and planners Robert Imrie, Loretta Lees, Mike Raco (Imrie, 
Lees and Raco 2009, 40 - 60) as well as Brian Hocking and Steven McGuire (Hocking and 
McGuire 2004, 5 - 12)have often espoused the virtues of high-services industries such as 
investment banking and financial services as an integral component of the post-industrial 
economy for the United Kingdom. As a provider of desirable high income employment with 
few environmental costs, governments have opted to encourage the formation of a financial 
industry through tax incentives, subsidies and lax regulations (Sobel 2002, 210 - 230). The 
structural economic power of the industry, in no small way, is derived from its ability to 
create large scale employment that forms the backbone of the thriving London economy. 
What this section seeks to address is whether the industry’s ability to engage the labour 
force has increased or decreased since the global financial crisis, as this is a component of 
the industry’s overall structural power and ability to reward and punish government.  
Perhaps the most important aspect of investment banks engagement with the labour 
market is the number of employees engaged at any given time. At its peak, the financial 
industry employed one million and seventy eight thousand employees in 2007, with one 
third employed in investment banking, whilst by 2011, this amount had declined to a little 
over a million direct employees (Office of National Statistics 2010). With almost eighty 
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thousand workers unemployed due to the global financial crisis, the significance and the 
attractiveness of investment banks as an employer has somewhat declined in this regard.  
A sharp recovery in recruitment however indicates that most jobs lost during the 
2007 – 2010 period will be replaced in the very immediate future with recruitment 
increasing by seventy per cent from 2010 to 2011 (Morgan Mckingley 2011). When 
compared to the national average, investment banker wages have increased robustly, 
averaging seven per cent in 2009 in a year when the average British worker’s wage 
decreased by 0.4 per cent (UK Centre for Economics and Business Research 2009). With this 
said, this increase in wages has largely been to offset the decline in bonus payouts that 
decreased by nine per cent from 2008 – 2009, though still costing a total of six billion and 
seven hundred million pounds. As aforementioned, compared to the 0.4 per cent nationwide 
downturn in wages, bankers in ‘The City’ remain lucratively renumerated before, during and 
after the Global Financial Crisis.  
While the direct employment of the investment banking industry is immense within 
the context of a relatively new industry, the number of ancillary industries and other 
employment that has sprung up around investment banks has also been great. While the 
exact number of jobs is hard to measure, within Canary Wharf, the heart of the financial 
sector, the Business Register and Employment Survey suggests that some two hundred and 
thirty two thousand non-financial sector jobs in construction and retail were created due to 
the investment banks situated there (Office of National Statistics 2010). TheCityUK asserts 
that similar ratio can be extended throughout the United Kingdom economy, with hundreds 
of thousands of jobs being created as a result of the financial industry (TheCityUK 2011). In 
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the eyes of government, this constitutes not just a growth in tax base and employment, but 
also the structural economic power of the financial industry.  
From 2007 to 2011 the labour market engagement of investment banks remained 
stable or slightly decreased, and as such, it would appear that so too has some of the 
structural power of investment banks as an economic powerhouse providing employment 
for ‘The City’. Treasury predictions however, expect an overall increase in employment 
relating to the financial industry in the period of 2011 – 2015, even with the job losses of the 
2007 – 2011 periods (Office of National Statistics 2009). This is reflected in an uptake of 
employment in 2010 – 2011 of a modest eleven thousand jobs in the financial industry. It is 
also important to note that both the high-end property and luxury goods market are highly 
dependent on investment banker’s bonuses according to industry group representatives that 
operate in the London market (AboutProperty 2011) (Savill 2011). Ledbury Research 
estimates that some two thirds of all bank bonuses paid in cash, rather than stock, go 
directly into the luxury market (Ledbury Corporate Research 2010).  
Another important element is investment bank’s labour force engagement is the 
level of graduate recruitment. As significant as graduate employment is in of itself in 
generating jobs, graduate programmes are also an indicator of long-term employment 
commitment by investment banks to training traders, analysts and other specialised 
professionals. Graduate recruitment in finance has declined slightly, though not as 
precipitously as other employment categories within the British economy. In the years 
following the global financial crisis, recruitment decreased by 2.8 per cent with total 
graduate intake dropping below ten thousand for the first time since the early 2000s (Higher 
Education Statistics Agency 2007). However, this modest decrease in recruitment tends to 
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reinforce the Treasury findings that suggest investment banks will tend to increase their 
labour force engagement over the long-run. This does not include investments made by 
individuals into tertiary qualifications only relevant to the finance field, and hence highly 
dependent on the industry for employment.  
To conclude, from 2007 to 2011 the investment banking sector’s labour engagement 
has seen slight decline that is now in its recovery phase, however the size of this decline and 
recovery is nowhere comparable to general trends in the British economy. Both private and 
public sector forecasters foresee a recovery of the former position of investment banks as 
job creators, and long-term investments in the labour market have been largely unaffected 
in anticipation of higher long run demand for skilled financial sector workers. From the 
standpoint of the labour force, the structural economic dependency on investment banks 
has, if anything increased, as it is the investment banks that are leading the recovery in the 
British labour market.  
Banking Mobility and Flight  
 
As mentioned by Fuchs (Fuchs 2007), it has been argued that a key element of business 
power in the globalised era is the ability of ‘transnational’ corporations to move from one 
country to another. This is especially significant in the financial industry and investment 
banking as there is a perception that capital based industries such as investment banks can 
move with greater ease than ordinary corporations. With the aforementioned ability of 
investment banks to ‘reward’ government with favourable economic conditions, this section 
assesses investment bank’s power to punish government by moving their operations. 
Through looking at regulatory and operational flexibility, this section will assess the ability of 
industry to quickly transfer its operations from one country to another, and whether this 
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ability has or increased diminished over the past four years, thus reducing the real structural 
power of the financial industry. While this issue is also discursive, as the perception of 
business mobility by society and regulators is as potent as real mobility, this section seeks to 
test the evolving economic realities underpinning this notion and determine whether there 
is a reality to the notion of a highly internationally mobile finance industry.  
The United Kingdom is perceived by other European states to take the most laissez 
faire approach to financial regulation (The Guardian 2009) (Majone 1996, 66) (Ebbinghaus 
and Mannow 2001, 20 - 60), traditionally limiting new regulation in negotiations for Basel II 
and III, the European negotiations for general increases in bank standards and regulations. 
The Aite Group noted in 2010, that both European and the United States new financial 
regulation measures on hedge funds have led to higher compliance cost, while the Financial 
Services Authority in the United Kingdom did not feel similar regulations on hedge funds 
were required (Aite Group 2011). In a study by Julian Franks, Stephen Schaefer and Michael 
Stauton, the overhead costs relating to regulatory compliance were lowest in the United 
Kingdom, followed by France and entirely below that of the United States. 
 An investment bank moving from the United Kingdom to another country would face 
significant regulatory compliance costs, as most advanced post-industrial countries have 
regulation that, though varying in comprehensiveness, are certainly more expensive that 
those in the United Kingdom (Franks, Schaefer and Staunton 1992). As such, as noted by 
Mervyn King, Governor of the Bank of England in Parliament, that the margins of saving for 
investment banks on regulative costs by operating in the United Kingdom are so high that 
the cost of regulatory compliance is prohibitive for the movement of investment banks, 
whether in 2007 or 2011 (House of Commons: Treasury Committee 2010, 20 - 40).   
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To take the example of Barclays that has threatened to move its headquarters to 
both Hong Kong and New York (The Telegraph 2011), such a move would cost hundreds of 
millions of dollars according to Bloomberg (Bloomberg USA 2011) while also limiting access 
to cheaper capital flows in the United Kingdom (McKinsley Global Institute 2011) and one of 
the largest pools of qualified financial experts in the world. In reality the tax situation in 
Britain is favourable toward investment banks when compared to other financial centres, 
with investment bank HSBC paying higher taxes in Hong Kong than in the United Kingdom 
(Financial Times 2010). Industry experts also suggest that if a British bank was to move, only 
one in four staff would follow, meaning a substantial disruption of business activities 
(Prebon 2011).   
While discursively, the ability to quickly move operations to another major financial centre 
may or may not be a potent threat, in economic terms, there is little evidence that such 
ability really exists with none of the ‘big four’ major investment banks quitting the United 
Kingdom in this period, though all threatening to do so . Prohibitive regulatory compliance 
costs as well as operational costs beyond a lack of institutional compatibility suggest that 
investment banks cannot quickly move from one state to another. This threat is therefore a 
purely discursive one, which will be discussed further, though not a factor in the structural 
power of the investment banking industry.  
Concluding statements  
 
Intuitively, one may be led to believe that the global financial crisis would have severely 
hampered the structural power of investment banks in the United Kingdom. Key economic 
gauges however indicate that this is not true, and that the structural power of investment 
banks has increased since the Global Financial Crisis. While in absolute terms on some 
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indicators, investment banks have taken a negative turn, overall, their relative share of 
export earnings, jobs created, tax revenue generated and other key indicators have 
increased. In terms of dependency upon the sector to drive growth, in terms of jobs created 
and especially compared to the decline in other sectors of the British economy, the 
structural power of investment banks is stronger than before the crisis. This power is also 
forecast to grow, with government predicting larger export earnings and higher recruitment 
levels in the future. The structural power of the sector is reinforced by the ‘bank bailouts’ 
that have increased the exposure of the British government and economy to the 
performance of investment banks. Further, the issue of highly mobile investment banks is 
more of a discursive reality than an economic one, with investment banks unable to move 
quickly cross nationally both prior and post global financial crisis - and hence not effecting 
investment bank’s structural power either way.  In short, the structural power of investment 
banks have not been adversely affected by the Global Financial Crisis in a significant way, 
while empirical evidence suggests that in many regards, it has increased since 2007.  
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Chapter 4: The Instrumental Power of Investment Banking 
 
This chapter will explore the instrumental power of investment banks in the United 
Kingdom. Instrumental power is the influence that business exerts over policy makers to 
directly shape regulatory outcomes and the policy process. It is a form of power that is 
exerted in private to sway regulators and policy makers toward behaviour that they would 
not otherwise be inclined to. Through the use of this coercive power, investment banks may 
attempt to stifle parliamentary debate, prevent particular legislative items from being 
proposed or dull the effectiveness of regulators. As Fuchs (2007) argues, this power 
manifests itself in many different ways, a primary method being the use of technical and 
financial resources to directly influence the behaviour of regulators and policy-makers. 
Business also often utilises political donations to exert instrumental power over politicians in 
conjunction with lobbyists to influence policy makers on issues before they subject to public 
scrutiny. This chapter will analyse the interactions between the United Kingdom’s 
investment banks and its chief financial regulator, the Financial Services Authority, as well as 
with politicians and their affiliated parties through political donations and lobbyists, to 
understand whether and how the instrumental power of investment banks has changed 
since the Global Financial Crisis.   
Instrumental Power of Government: A Case Study of Regulatory Capture  
 
  The Financial Services Authority (FSA) is the primary regulatory body in the United 
Kingdom charged with four statutory objectives outlined in the Financial Services and 
Markets Acts (2000) these are the; maintaining market confidence, public awareness, 
consumer protection and the reducing financial crime. For the last decade investment banks, 
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building societies and the vast majority of financial services fell under the purview of the 
Financial Services Authority and despite the June 16th 2011 Chancellor of the Exchequer’s 
announcement of the FSA’s planned dissolution (Osborne 2010), it remains the United 
Kingdom’s principle financial regulatory agency.  
In practice the Financial Services Authority is charged with prosecuting financial 
crimes such as the sale of misleading or predatory financial products, ensuring the integrity 
of advice given by investment firms through the licensing of those eligible to trade and 
maintaining the integrity of investment banks by ordering the auditing of firms and 
prosecuting breaches of financial regulations. From 2000 – 2007 the Financial Services 
Authority is accused in the Turner Review, a report commission by the British government, 
of neglecting its duties in allowing firms to engage in high risk behaviour, predatorily lend to 
at-risk individuals, allow the proliferation of CDOs and failed to generally ensure the integrity 
of the financial advice being sold to the general public.  
The following section will outline the manner in which the Financial Services 
Authority became dependent on the technical and financial resources of investment banks, 
the exact nature of this reliance as well as its implications for regulation and finally it will 
assess how this manifestation of investment bank’s instrumental power has evolved since 
the Global Financial Crisis.   
Overstretched and Underfinanced: The Financial Services Authority 
 
The practical task of the Financial Services Authority involves overseeing several 
hundred thousand investment bankers, including certifying CF30 investment advisors, or 
those twenty eight thousand eight hundred and thirty five individuals permitted to oversee 
39 
 
the vending of financial products and advice to the general public. The FSA must also ensure 
the integrity of investment firms, varying from larger firms like the ‘big four’ investment 
banks that have combined seventy seven to eight five per cent market share (European 
Commision 2011), to smaller firms that are sometimes little more than sole traders.  Toward 
these tasks the Financial Services Authority, as of 2010, employs some four thousand 
employees (The Financial Services Authority 2011), of which an estimated three to four 
hundred are dedicated toward the Conduct Business Unit (CBU) (OECD 2010) that is 
responsible for supervising investment banks. As a total of all FSA employees, some ten per 
cent are university graduates or currently undergoing tertiary qualifications (The Financial 
Services Authority 2011), this encompasses all certified financial and legal professionals that 
are integral in the enforcement process.  
A major issue for the Financial Services Authority has been its inability to attract staff 
levels perceived as adequate by the Authority’s recruitment goals. Information from the 
Authority reveals that over the past decade it has failed to meet its own graduate 
recruitment and staff retention goals repeatedly (Omidi 2010) (Financial Services Authority 
2010). The cause of this dearth is the growing promise of investment banks for graduates 
coveted by both the private sector and the authority. A primary example of this dynamic is 
illustrated in The Time’s opinion survey that lists the top one hundred employers in the eyes 
of recent graduates. While major investment banks HSBC, Barclays, RBS Group, Lloyds, Citi 
Group, Deutche Bank and Credit Suisse consistently rank highly, the Financial Services 
Authority has only ranked in the Top 100 once in the 2005 – 2011 periods. (Times Higher 
Education Review 2011).   
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 Human resources firm Hedley May as well as the Financial Times point to the lower 
salaries paid at the regulator, estimating that to recruit staff of the quality the FSA requires, 
the Authority must increase wages by thirty five to fifty per cent (Financial Times 2010) 
(Hedley May 2011). In 2010 the average FSA employee earned £ 56,473 pounds (Waters 
2010) with a further 213 employees earning over £100,000 according to a Freedom of 
Information request put to the regulator (FinancialTimes 2010) (Financial Services Authority 
2010). In contrast the average employee of major investment bank Barclay Capital earned 
£236,000 per annum with an average annual bonus of £140,000 or seven thousand pounds 
higher than average wage of a FSA employee (Treanor 2011), Deutsche Bank posted similar 
results, with employees bringing in three hundred and seventy two thousand pounds in 2010 
(Murphy, Jenkins and Baer 2011). These discrepancies in earning power extend to senior 
management across the private sector and the regulator (FinancialTimes 2010) (Financial 
Services Authority 2010, 92) while bonuses paid to FSA employees, which in 2009 - 10 paid 
twenty-two million pounds worth of bonuses amounting to 7,269 pounds per employee 
(Watts 2010), were almost a third less than the 12,500 pounds bonus on average throughout 
the financial industry (Inman 2011). 
 The FSA and British government have often justified salaries and bonuses higher than 
ordinary public servants upon the premise that the “FSA must compete with the financial 
sector for employees”. The salaries, conditions or the reputation of the FSA have clearly not 
been enough to woo employees with the appropriate technical skills, as for three 
consecutive years, the Financial Services Authority has failed to recruit the levels of staff its 
feels it requires to properly regulate (Financial Services Authority 2011) (Michael Page 
Financial Services 2010, 4).   
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Outsourcing Regulation 
 
The FSA’s own targets for staffing levels reveals it has failed to retain what it seems 
to be the necessary human resources to commit to regulating the British financial sector in 
years prior to the crisis and after it. This has led to the outsourcing of many of the key 
regulatory functions of the authority to private sources or a reliance on investment bank’s 
resources and information. This is exhibited in the Authority’s dependency on industry 
assistance for the provision of adequate staff through secondees as well as the resources to 
conduct investigations. The implication of this dependency on industry co-operation and 
self-regulation is the strengthening of investment bank’s instrumental power, in defining and 
shaping the nature of regulation.  
Of those three to four hundred staff dedicated toward supervising investment banks 
in the Conduct Business Unit, a third to a half of these staff will be secondees from the 
industry (Financial Services Authority 2010). The Authority states that most of its employees 
“come from and return to regulated firms”, with more than half being from the industry at 
any given time.  Major investment banks such as the Royal Bank of Scotland, Investec, 
Deutsche bank, Barclays, Standard Chartered Bank, UBC and HSBC were all contracted in 
2011 to provide ‘consultancy’ work to the Authority valued at over one and a half million 
pounds annually in addition to external ‘City’ staff valued at a little over five hundred 
thousand pounds (Waters 2010) (Financial Services Authority 2010). Of these firms, three 
were recipients of Asset Protection Scheme funds after engaging in the high risk trading that 
contributed toward the financial crisis (Financial Services Authority 2011). In the simplest 
terms, the Authority pays for the advice of private firms it is charged with regulating, that 
have demonstrably engaged in activities that the Authority is entrusted with restraining. 
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With half of its enforcement arm coming from the industry, and further consultants being 
paid to assist them in their activities, there is a clear opportunity for ‘The City’ to utilise its 
technical capabilities and financial expertise that the FSA is dependent upon, to influence 
the practices of the regulator. 
The Authority further spent from 2009 – 2010 sixteen million one hundred thousand 
pounds on consultancy from seven major ‘City’ firms that obtain significant billings from 
every investment bank listed in the Top 100 FTSE companies including all of the ‘Big Four’ 
banks (EFinancial 2011) (Financial Services Authority 2010). Pricewaterhousecooper (PWC), a 
major beneficiary of those FSA contracts was found to have acted without “due care, skill 
and diligence” by Accountancy & Actuarial Disciplinary Board when dealing with investment 
bank JP Morgan Chase’s statutory reports to the FSA, this failure allowed some £23bn worth 
of capital to not be adequately ring fenced per regulatory standard (Bowers 2011) 
(Accountancy & Actuarial Discipline Board 2011). Similarly Ernest & Young, another major 
FSA contractor, is engaged in legal proceedings over misleading investors by allegedly 
‘window dressing’ the accounts of collapsed investment bank Lehman Brothers (People of 
the State of New York v. Ernst & Young 2010). 
 Of those six firms contracted with assisting FSA’s in prudential enforcement and 
investigations, all four have had adverse decisions regarding their audits of investment 
banking activities. For instance, when former HBOS Plc3 whistle-blower Mr Paul Moore4 
raised concerns regarding high-risk trading at the investment bank, KPMG was charged by 
the FSA with investigating the auditing of HBOS, also conducted by KPMG for a fee of £11m 
                                                           
3
 Halifax Bank of Scotland, investment bank, subsidiary of Lloyds TSB 
4
 Mr Paul Moore was Head of Risk at HBOS from 2002 – 2005,  after being a partner at accounting firm KPMG 
from 1992 – 2002 
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per annum from HBOS, for possible wrong doing. The report recommended no disciplinary 
measures against HBOS, which would collapse in the crisis, while the HBOS manager who 
personally sacked Moore would go on to be the Deputy Chair of the FSA (Moore 2010) (The 
Telegraph 2009) (Times 2009).  Similarly, FSA contractor PWC assisted in 2006 the Northern 
Rock bank with the ‘raising of wholesale funding’ that would eventuate in the investment 
bank’s downfall (Northern Rock Bank 2009, 72). PWC was then charged by regulators with 
investigating and advising regulators regarding Northern Rocks pre-crisis activities, a report 
that controversially exonerated Northern Rock (The Guardian 2007). The outsourcing of the 
FSA’s investigations and enforcement to financial firms with significant contracts also with 
investment banks has allowed the industry to exercise a great level of instrumental power 
over regulators, in effect blunting regulation and securing favourable decisions.  
These criticisms call into question the Authority’s use of its Section 166 powers for 
investigations, outlined in the Financial Services and Markets Act (2000). This process 
requires firms to acquire reports from other self-nominated financial firms that may 
potentially be rendered as evidence by the Authority. In 2009/2010 half of the Section 166 
investigations were undertaken by the aforementioned ‘Big Four’ accountancy firms 
(Financial Services Authority 2010). These same firms all count investment banks as client, 
while all have also had adverse findings regarding the quality of the auditing of one or more 
investment banks prior to the Global Financial Crisis. The advice received by regulators from 
this process, much like the advice and technical resources provided by secondees and 
consultants from investment banks are questionable. Rather than assisting the FSA in its 
duties, these arrangements expose the regulator to the instrumental power of investment 
banks.  
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The Changing Culture of ‘Soft Touch’ Regulation  
 
 “It (was) clear that the FSA became the victim of regulatory capture. From the start, 
market confidence was the overriding objective and consumer protection was not given 
sufficient weight. ‘Light touch regulation’ was the watchword” 
Deborah Arnott, Former Senior Financial Services Authority Employee5  
 As outlined above, the Financial Services Authority has substituted its lack of 
technical and financial expertise by relying on industry resources, and in doing so, has given 
the sector the ability to influence the application of regulation. This compromise in the 
integrity of the regulator is attested to by numerous past employees as well as current 
leadership in the Authority as the ‘soft touch’ approach toward regulation. This culture 
within the regulator is the product of the strong influence investment banking has over the 
regulator through the FSA’s reliance on industry co-operation and resources to conduct its 
duties. It is characterised by a greater emphasis on maintaining confidence in investment 
banks then protecting consumers or ensuring market stability and a failure to rigorously 
investigate and prosecute financial crime.   
In testimony to the House of Commons Regulatory Reform committee, numerous 
former FSA employees, senior management as well as independent experts testified to the 
understaffing and under resourcing of the regulator, with the committee noting that the 
                                                           
5
 Deborah Arnott was employed by the FSA from 2000 – 2004, Managing the setup of its Consumer Education 
program. In an interview she attests to the regulator failing to serve the public interest, rather being pre-
occupied with maintaining confidence in the investment banks (Arnott 2010).   
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Authority was severely hindered by a “problems with turnover in high-grade staff” leading to 
an inability “to stand up to senior management in big firms” (Commitee on Regulatory 
Reform 2010). Analysis of the FSA’s verification procedures from 2006 – 2008 reveals the 
Authority’s minimalistic approach to regulation, conducting five hundred and four checks 
out of twenty nine thousand financial firms (Financial Services Authority 2009). On an annual 
basis, less than one per cent of firms can expect the Authority to verify the veracity of their 
accounts. In the same year the FSA only requested eighteen Section 166 investigations of 
firms to provide further technical information regarding firm activities (Financial Services 
Authority 2010). Comparably, in enforcing tax law, Her Majesty’s Revenue & Customs 
(HMRC) spent £854m to employ some two thousand inspectors (HM Revenues and Customs 
2010) to investigate and verify claims by accountants and tax practitioners, leading to a 
survey of practitioners revealing one in four had been audited (Chartered Institute of 
Taxation 2010). Compared to the enforcement of tax law, the FSA’s verification process is 
clearly lacklustre and indicative of an organisation engaging in what one former employee 
labelled the FSA’s attitude toward enforcement that “ranged from indifference to wilful 
ignorance” (Cable 2009) 
 
Figure 3 - FSA Fines & Section 166 Investigations According to Freedom of Information Requests 
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In a sign that the Global Financial Crisis has caused the regulator to reject the 
instrumental power of the investment banks, and assert its regulatory powers, the new FSA 
Chairman Adair Turner acknowledged the Authority’s ‘soft touch’ approach to regulation as 
inappropriate (Schifferes 2009) (Hall 2009) and the aforementioned technical dependence 
on investment banks as “regulation the cheap way” (Elliot 2009), whilst calling for a more 
aggressive and capable Authority. The FSA’s chief executive Hector Saints commented in an 
interview “There is a view that people are not frightened of the FSA…this is a view I am 
determined to correct” (Saints 2009) in what Elisabeth Bremmer of DLA Piper describes as a 
transition to new regime of ‘credible deterrence’ (DLA Draper and Bremmer 2009). 
Reformations include an attempt to increase staff levels by four hundred and sixty full-time 
employees or fifteen per cent to expand its regulatory capabilities and reduce reliance on 
the industry for resources (Financial Services Authority 2011). To finance this move and 
other improvements, the regulator has also significantly increased its industry levy by ten 
per cent to take its operational budget from £457m to £500.5m to pay for these extra 
capabilities (Financial Services Authority 2011). This shift in attitude and increase in 
resources has seen tangible results in a dramatic increase in investigation requests, by 
almost five hundred and fifty per cent from 06/07 to 2010, while fines issued by the 
Authority jumped a dramatic one thousand eight hundred per cent between 2007, when 
£5m worth of fines were issued, to 2010, at £89m, with fines tripling each year since 
Chairman Turner’s announcement of the end of ‘soft touch regulation’ (Financial Services 
Authority 2011) (Financial Services Authority 2011). 
What is clear is that since its inception, the Financial Services Authority has taken an 
approach toward financial regulation that was defined by and reliant on the instrumental 
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power and capabilities of investment banks. Since the Financial Crisis, this trend has 
reversed, with the regulator attempting to build the technical capabilities and culture 
required to investigate and enforce financial regulations. Since then however, plans to 
disband the regulator have resulted in immediate loss of the FSA’s credibility within the 
industry and more than two hundred and fifty five staff resignations (Kechington 2010) 
(Financial Services Authority 2010), in effect quickly undoing those developments made by 
the Authority since the financial crisis. Notably, fines issued by the regulator have dropped in 
2011 by a third from the same period in 2010 (Financial Services Authority 2011).  While the 
regulator has clearly had a great level of influence over the nature and style of regulation, 
especially as it independently sets its own budget from industry levies (Winnett 2009) 
(House of Commons Select Committee 2010), the power of policy-makers in the regulative 
process is unparalleled, and will be discussed further.   
Instrumental Power of Investment Banks: Political Donations, Lobbyists & Buying 
Access 
The nature of instrumental power is the ability to manipulate decision making outside of the 
public arena. While the section above discussed investment bank’s instrumental power in 
co-opting regulators to affect influence over policy outcomes, the following section discusses 
the ability of investment banks to influence policy and debate before its inception. 
Important elements of this instrumental power is the level of political donations by 
investment firms, the prominence and resources dedicated toward lobbying and the level of 
access those donations and lobbyists yield for investment firms in effecting private change. 
This section will outline how these attempts to influence policy makers have transitioned 
since the financial crisis through the analysis of political contributions, lobbyist meeting logs 
and testimony from politicians amongst other sources of data.    
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Political Donations: Investment Banks & the Political Process  
 
Campaign spending has become an increasingly important aspect of the British political 
process, with donations being integral to the strategies undertaken by major political 
parties. Political donations utilised by investment banks and their stakeholders have been 
used by investment banks for the purpose of purchasing access and leverage over policy 
makers, to ensure that before and after public debate, private decision making will include 
the input of investment banks. This following section explores the extent of personal 
donations, loans and corporate donations made by the sector to influence the political 
process.   
When analysing political donations during the 2010 United Kingdom General election, one 
thing becomes eminently clear, notable investment banks largely do not donate to political 
parties. While a few investment firms have donated money a significant proportion of 
donations come from individuals closely linked to the industry, such as major stockholders, 
corporate officers and owners of private equity firms as well as their spouses. Using this 
looser definition of industry donations, twenty five per cent of donations to the Conservative 
Party and five per cent of Labour’s donations came from the industry during the 2010 
General Election. The Conservative Party in the United Kingdom advertises that donations to 
the party valued over £25,000 are rewarded with membership to the ‘The Treasurers Group’ 
with exclusive access to MPs and senior cabinet ministers year round. Donations of £50,000 
purchase membership to ‘The Leader’s Group’, which is tantamount to access to the Prime 
Minister David Cameron (The Conservative Party 2010). The UK Labour Party similarly runs, 
albeit more subtly, the ‘Thousand Club’ for members donating over £1200 annually (UK 
Labour Party 2010). Over the election period, those individuals and companies with 
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significant interests in investment firms constituted close to one in eight donors6 to major 
parties donating a cumulative total of £3,473,000 of the £13,460,127 or twenty per cent of 
the donations to major parties during the election (UK Electoral Commision 2011).  
Investment banks have mostly reframed from donating publically to political parties, 
as have major financial institutions. During the 2010 general election, the only investment 
bank to make an officially declared donation to either major political party was JP Morgan 
Chase (UK Electoral Commision 2011). This however is the tip of a very large iceberg created 
by a loophole in the Political Parties, Elections and Referendum Act (2000). While donations 
over £5,000 must be declared, loans offered at market rate do not. This has created an 
avenue for banks to indefinitely bankroll major political parties (Jones 2006). In many cases 
these loans appear to have no end date, low interest rates and the offer of additional loans 
to finance the interest of previous loans.  Most notably, the Royal Bank of Scotland, HSBC 
and the Bank of Scotland (HBOS) –have been extremely prominent in bankrolling both 
political parties. From June 2007 to June 2011, the aforementioned investment banks lent 
£858m to major British political parties. Pre-crisis lending by these same investment banks, 
was similar at £ 871m from June 2004 to June 2007 (see appendix c for transaction list) (UK 
Electoral Commision 2011). In this manner, this particular form of instrumental power has 
not dulled due to the financial crisis, and given the overall 74% reduction in campaign 
spending from the 2005 to 2010 election, investment banks have stepped up their 
contributions. Significantly, lending to political parties has been overwhelmingly from the 
Royal Bank of Scotland, Lloyds and its troubled subsidiary HBOS, the major benefactors of 
the Asset Protection Scheme.  
                                                           
6
 1 in 7.67 donors  
 Figure 4 Direct Investment Bank Donations 2001 
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The Growing Industry of Lobbyists  
 
“Parliament (must lead) in resisting some of the excessive lobbying which will no 
doubt rain down on your heads while this (regulation) is being debated" 
– Mervyn King, Governor of the Bank of England (Allen 2010) 
While monetary donations to political parties and individuals reflect the instrumental power 
of investment banks, these donations serve in a manner, as an introduction for investment 
banks to further lobby ministers, parliamentarians and even the Prime Minister. There is a 
significant incentive for investment banks to engage in this behaviour, often public policy 
can be altered privately, and lobbying gives investment banks the unique ability to define 
the nature of public discourse and what politicians are willing to regulate on. A recent IMF 
study has found a high correlation between investment banks that engage in intense 
lobbyist and those firms that engage in high-risk transactions (Mathiason 2010). The IMF 
also comments that in the United States, those banks that lobbied that government hardest 
were also the largest and often principal recipients of bailout funds (LaCapra 2010) (Igan, 
Mishra and Tressel 2010). This is consistent with the experience in the United Kingdom, 
wherein ‘loans’ made to political parties were predominantly made by The Royal Bank of 
Scotland, followed by HBOS and its parent company Lloyds. These banks were also the major 
beneficiaries of the Asset Protection Scheme as part of the ‘bank bailouts’ of 2009.  The 
following section seeks to appraise the scope and level of access that investment bank 
lobbyists have in the United Kingdom and whether the Global Financial Crisis has affected 
this behaviour.  
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An analysis of the senior treasury officials meetings with ‘interest groups’ in the year 
prior to and immediately following the banking crisis provides significant insight into the 
level of lobbying that investment banks engage in, and further, how these activities have 
increased significantly since the financial crisis. As illustrated below, as the Global Financial 
Crisis becomes more apparent, lobbyists begin meeting with these key individuals regarding 
financial issues, on a near weekly basis. More importantly, investment banking lobbyists are 
afforded direct access to the Chancellor of Exchequer, the second most senior minister in 
Cabinet, on almost every occasion. It is important to note that on many instances, requests 
for information were “withheld under section 29 (1) (a), as release of these meetings may 
prejudice the economic interests of the UK”. (Her Majesty's Treasury 2011) (HM Treasury 
2010) (HM Treasury 2010) (HM Treasury 2009) (HM Treasury 2011).  This includes the 
number and subject of any meeting with lobbyists over this period. What is apparent from 
the data available though, is that since the Global Financial Crisis investment bank lobbyists 
have stepped up a campaign to influence senior government officials, their instrumental 
power is evident in that these individuals have increasingly received and entertained the 
industry’s representatives.   
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An important element of this lobbying is the recruitment of high-profile party and 
public officials to spearhead lobbying efforts. While freedom of information requests about 
the exact levels of crossover between these two groups cannot be granted on privacy 
grounds, several high profile cases illustrate this dynamic.  Most prominently featured is 
Prime Minister Gordon Brown’s spokesperson Simon Lewis’s decision to join major industry 
lobby the Association of Financial Markets (Treanor 2010) as well as Howell James, Sumatra 
Prasad, Dominic Morris all senior public servants poached as lobbyists by Barclays amongst 
many more (Spinwatch 2011)(see appendix d for list). Some industry leaders have also so far 
been invited to the private residence of Prime Minister David Cameron, an honour usually 
reserved for foreign dignitaries, elected officials or media personalities (Prime Minister's 
Office 2010). All this is part of a more concerted approach by investment banks to alter the 
course of public policy using privileged access to politicians and decision makers, to this end, 
according to the Chartered Institute of Public Relations, the premier body for lobbyists in the 
United Kingdom, at least seventeen large investment banks engage more than twenty-four 
lobbyists firms to lobby government on their behalf. It should be noted that these reflect 
self-reported lobbyists, with seventy-five per cent of the United Kingdom’s estimated 
fourteen thousand lobbyists opting not to disclose their clients and activities  (UK Public 
Affairs Council, CIPR 2011).  
Numerous accounts by industry and government sources attest to this ramping up of 
lobbying in anticipation of new regulation or adverse reports findings in the wake of the 
financial crisis. Since the crisis, both the Confederation of British Industry as well as the 
British Bankers Association that together form the peak lobbying bodies of investment banks 
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and bankers, have both claimed to have “stepped up” their efforts in anticipation of new 
regulation (Weir 2011). Interviews with Angela Knight, Head of the Banker’s Association as 
well as John Cridland, Head of the Confederation of British Industry reveal that there is at 
least a co-ordinated and concerted effort by the industry to privately shape the nature of 
regulative policy. Anonymous sources within the Bank of England also comment that during 
such meetings with lobbyist, representatives from investment bank HSBC threatened to quit 
the United Kingdom should the government regulate the investment banking sector, a claim 
denied by the bank itself (Neate 2011).  These claims are reinforced by senior government 
ministers claiming “they’ve (the investment bank lobbyist have) been bending my ear like 
mad” (Jenkins 2011) with Business Secretary Vince Cable claiming this intense lobbying may 
come to undermine attempts to regulate the industry (Mulholland and Quin 2011) 
(Spinwatch 2011, 8). 
What is revealed from the meeting logs of government officials, the revolving door 
between political staff and investment banks and from the accounts of senior lobbyists and 
politicians, is that since the Global Financial Crisis, the British investment banks have utilised 
their privileged access to policy makers to privately make their case.  Often meeting with the 
most senior of government officials, lobbyists from investment banks exert a great level of 
instrumental power in attempting to influence legislation and regulative outcomes. The 
aforementioned data is only the tip of the ice berg, with freedom of information releases 
being currently subject to government censorship and the lobbyist registrar being a 
voluntary option that the vast majority of firms do not adhere to.  
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Concluding Statements 
 
Since the Global Financial Crisis, investment banks have attempted to increasingly influence 
the political process through donations and affect change through the use of lobbyists. In 
the 2010 election it is clear that investment banks, their allies and proxies stepped up their 
sizable financial contributions to the winning Conservative Party in an attempt to influence 
policy makers. This is also evident in the increase in lobbyist activities, with lobbyists gaining 
and utilising access to some of the highest ranked officials in the United Kingdom. Further, in 
reaction to the events of the Global Financial Crisis, the Financial Services Authority has 
attempted to assert its regulatory powers as well as increase its technical capabilities, so it 
may regulate independently of the instrumental power of investment banks. This is in 
response, however, to the strong influence investment banks have had over the course and 
nature of regulatory activities.  
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Chapter 5: The Discursive Power of Investment Banking 
 
As Fuchs (2007) argues, discursive power is the capacity of business to influence societal 
norms, ideas and discussion toward favourable ends. It is the ability to legitimise the power 
and activities of business, in this case Britain’s investment banks, in a manner that is pre-
emptive, persuasive and all-encompassing. The following chapter will dissect the nature of 
investment bank’s discursive power in the United Kingdom and assess, through the analysis 
of public discourse, how the discursive presence of investment banks has evolved since the 
Global Financial Crisis.  This chapter will first look at the attempts by investment banks to 
influence public discussion and reinforce their legitimacy since the financial meltdown of 
2007. Then, through the analysis select speeches by senior government officials, it will seek 
to address the nature of government discourse regarding investment banks. Finally, to 
understand the overall changes in public discourse, key newspapers and public polling 
information will be analysed to better comprehend the changing character of investment 
bank’s perceived legitimacy within British society. In this manner, through the examination 
business, government societal discourse, one can arrive at a holistic depiction of the change 
in investment bank’s discursive power over this period.  
‘Other Voices’:  Investment Banks Shaping Discourse  
 
Since the Global Financial Crisis, Britain’s investment banks have attempted to exercise 
influence over the nature and course of public discourse. This has manifested itself in 
different ways, a prominent example of investment banks discursive power is, as Fuchs 
describes it, the industry adopting ‘other voices’ such as independent organisations to shape 
public discussion. In addition to this and perhaps in response to a changing discursive 
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environment, investment banks have often attempted to reinforce the belief that they are 
highly mobile and cannot be regulated, while in fact this is not true, as explored earlier in 
Chapter 3: The Structural Power of Investment Banks – Bank Mobility and Flight. Through the 
analysis of these aspects of investment bank’s discursive power, one can better understand 
the campaign waged by investment banks to shape public discourse.  
In 2008 ‘TheCityUK’ became the premier of those ‘other voices’ employed by 
investment banks to shape discourse through the merger of the two largest industry lobby 
groups7, forming an organisation with the stated goal of “promoting UK financial services at 
home and overseas and playing an active role in the regulatory and trade policy debate” 
(TheCityUK 2009) and the unofficial power and task of co-ordinating an array of industry 
lobby groups (Masters 2009). A membership based organisation funded by the financial 
sector, TheCityUK’s steering committee and leadership are dominated by prominent 
investment banks – the Chairman of its Board of Directors is also the Chairman of Citi Group, 
the Chairman of its Advisory Group is the Chairman of Lloyds (see appendix e for list of Board 
of Directors, Advisory Council, and their respective professional positions). Therefore 
analysing the publications and research produced by this group reveals how investment 
banks are attempting to influence discourse in Britain using a self-described “independent 
and non-partisan” organisation as a collective mouthpiece.  
From January 2010 to September 2011, TheCityUK has published sixty two articles 
and thirty-eight research reports. These publications share a common unifying characteristic 
in that they present information that portrays the positive impacts of the financial services 
sector and in particular, investment banks. These include reports outlining the contribution 
                                                           
7
 The merger of International Financial Services London (also known as ‘The Invisibles’) and The Financial Sector 
Advisory Board 
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of investment banks toward building carbon markets or generating employment and export 
revenue for the United Kingdom. These reports are often coupled with commentary 
condemning concepts such as a transaction tax as “especially damaging” for London or 
“encouraging government to engage more widely with financial firms” in formulating 
regulation. Newspapers have been quick to broadcast TheCityUK’s message by mentioning 
or referencing the organisation two hundred and forty three times since its inception in 
2008. Through the production of favourable and processed data TheCityUK has attempted to 
influence public discourse. A representative example of this dynamic is the publication of 
employment figures showing an increase in recruiting. The figures produced by TheCityUK 
were quickly reproduced and referenced by the four major newspapers printing headlines 
such as “financial sector recovery” (The Daily Telegraph 2010) and “10,000 new jobs” (The 
Times 2010) (The Independent 2010) (The Sun 2010), after which the report garnered 
mentions speeches by the Chancellor and Shadow Chancellor of Exchequer (Balls 2011) 
(Osbourne 2010).  In this manner, under the guise of an ‘independent organisation’ and 
utilising a media willing to republish research and articles, investment banks attempt to 
exercise discursive power to shift the nature of public debate.   
TheCityUK further produces a range of videos as well as graphics with high 
production values to emphasise the positive aspects of investment banks in public discourse. 
In the video ‘Facts about the UK Financial Services’ released on its website and other social 
networking sites in March 2009, TheCityUK seeks emphasises the structural importance of 
investment banks to Britain’s economy. In a similar release, the organisation published 
region specific maps to breakdown employment generated by the industry across the United 
Kingdom. These videos, graphics and other illustrations are disseminated over the internet 
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but also at events, conferences, forums and panel discussions organised by TheCityUK across 
the United Kingdom. Since 2009 TheCityUK has organised some nighty nine of these events, 
timing them to coincide with important political conferences or to be televised as a public 
discussion on the future of regulation. By organising these events during periods of high 
exposure such as during the 2010 General Election, and inviting prominent politicians and 
academics, TheCityUK seeks to frame public debate and buttress the industry’s discursive 
power.  
Flight not Fight: Reinforcing the Myth of the Powerless State 
 
A major strategy of investment banks to influence public discourse has been the routine 
announcement of plans to leave London and quit the United Kingdom altogether due to 
changing regulation. As discussed in Chapter 3 it is highly unlikely that many of the larger 
investment banks do not have the ability to make such a drastic change, nor would it be 
justified economically even with new regulation in the United Kingdom. To date, while three 
of the ‘big four’ banks, Barclays, HSBC and Lloyds have announced plans to leave London in 
the past three years and speculated publically on leaving, none of the ‘big four’ banks have 
moved (Finch 2011).  
Rather, when Barclays and other leading financial institutions announce that they 
may leave to New York (Reuters 2010) or Hong Kong (The Daily Telegraph 2011) in response 
to unfavourable public discourse “calling for the breakup of big banks” (The Guardian 2010), 
it is aimed toward reminding the public of the economic importance of these institutions 
and re-centre public discourse from the extremes of anti-banker sentiment. This tactic has 
had a level of success, with the government’s review of the banking industry, the Vicker 
Report, recommending to not divide investment banks so as to “spike the guns of banks 
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threatening to leave London” (Clark and Finch 2011). Public discourse is altered when the 
media tends to echo the threats of the banks, without a real assessment of their merits. This 
is evident in numerous articles published by newspapers such as the Financial Times, 
Bloomberg, the Guardian, The Times, The Daily Telegraph and The Independent that tend to 
publish articles making statements such as “To Leave or not to leave” and simply 
republishing the statements made by senior bankers (The Financial Times 2010) (Bloomberg 
2010) (The Guardian 2010) (The Times 2010) (The Independent 2011).  
 The hollowness of these threats is illustrated in the fact that Deutsche Bank has often 
speculated in German newspapers over a prospective move to London (The London Evening 
Post 2010), for better regulatory conditions in the United Kingdom that Britain’s investment 
banks are so ready to leave. These announcements are a rather an attempt by Britain’s 
investment banks to favourably influence discourse and reframe public debate including the 
possibility of the investment banks leaving London. In many regards this is an act of 
desperation when faced with an increasingly negative discursive environment that will be 
discussed further in this chapter.  
Government Talks to the Banks – Discursive Engagement by Politicians and Regulators  
 
“Given the past year, any occasion where a Member of Parliament addresses a room 
of bankers is unlikely to win a popularity contest among the general public”  
- Chancellor of Exchequer Alistair Downing, 2009 
Since 1867 the Chancellor of the Exchequer and other senior government officials have 
taken the opportunity to address the Mansion House Dinner, an annual event hosted by the 
Lord Mayor of London to honour Britain’s Bankers and Merchants. Traditionally these 
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speeches serve a similar purpose to the State of the Union in the United States– wherein 
leading political authorities may brief the dinner and the public on economic issues and 
outline future policy (Major 1990). As Fuchs (2007), Hojanki and Kimball argue (Kimball and 
Hojnacki 1998), the analysis of discourse provides insight into the norms and values that 
come to shape decision making, and as Blommaert argues (Blommaert 2006), critical 
discourse analysis is a crucial tool in dissecting power relations. Principally what the 
following section seeks to appreciate is how this aspect of discourse has evolved since the 
Global Financial Crisis. Through analysing those speeches by the Chancellor of Exchequer and 
the Governor of the Bank of England made from 2006 to 2011, one can sense the level of 
investment banks perceived legitimacy in the eyes of the country’s highest ranking public 
officials.  
As the speeches to the Mansion House Dinner are both annual and an opportunity to 
outline government policy, it serves as an easily comparable summation of government 
rhetoric from year to year. While the individual in the position has changed thrice, from 
Gordon Brown to Alistair Darling in 2008, and to Conservative George Osbourne in 2010, the 
Chancellor’s House speech emblemises governments, rather than the individual’s, 
perceptions of legitimacy of the banking sector. As mentioned in earlier sections, 2006 – 
2007 was a period of unprecedented prosperity for investment banks, and this is reflected in 
the Chancellor’s speeches for these years, his address serving more as a congratulatory 
message and a re-affirmation of the government’s dedication to the free-market. The 
Chancellor is also careful to stress from 2006 into 2008, the structural importance of 
investment banks to the London economy, guaranteeing its “global pre-eminence”.  In this 
manner by emphasising the banks economic importance, he serves to reinforce their 
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legitimacy, characterising them as the standard bearer of British industry out-competing 
European competitors. From 2009 onwards this section completely disappears as the 
Chancellor acknowledges that “the costs of supporting the financial system has inevitably 
pushed up deficits” in contrast to his 2007 proclamation of a “new golden age for the City of 
London” brought on by the industry.  
Polling information, which will be discussed in further detail later  (YouGov 2011), indicates 
public opinion turned against investment banks during the crisis, this is acknowledged by the 
Chancellor in 2009 with;  
“it is traditional…to compliment the UK’s financial services sector…there may be 
some who think, given the role of some banks in the global economic turmoil that this 
tradition should be broken tonight, I intend to keep to the tradition” 
This statement emblemises the changing nature of the Chancellor’s speeches, as it 
increasingly reflects broader discursive shifts in government rhetoric. While the speeches in 
2006 and 2007 were broadly positive, with statements like “the twenty first century…is 
made for Britain” due to “a predictable and light tough regulatory environment” vastly 
outnumbering more negative statements by almost eight times. Likewise, by the time of the 
2010 and 2011 speeches, the Chancellor’s commonly issues statements such as “the British 
dilemma will remain so long as taxpayers are first on the hook if things go wrong (for 
investment banks” or commenting that when “a system of regulation fails so spectacularly… 
(it is) revealed just how ill-prepared they (the banks) were to withstand losses”.  
 At a holistic level the Chancellor’s speeches change tract from an opportunity for 
“bankers and ministers (to) come together to celebrate London’s strengths and 
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achievements” and reinforce the importance of regulatory stability, a phrase mentioned 
over a dozen times in both the 2006 and 2007 speeches, to one calling for a “change in 
culture”, to promote “greater transparency and accounting standards”. This is within a 
discursive context in 2011 of government officials proposing “betters systems (of 
regulation)” and a wholesale reappraisal of “what is the right culture of regulation” as 
opposed to reinforcing the status quo through pressing the importance of ‘stability’ as seen 
in the pre-crisis era. The Chancellor’s speeches reflect a changing discursive approach on the 
part of government toward investment banking that is clearly more critical of banking 
practices and the regulatory regime that allowed them to emerge.  
Similarly the speeches made by Bank of England Governor Mervyn King reflect a shift 
in the discursive engagement of the government’s largest regulator with investment banks 
over the same period. The legitimacy of investment banks, in their current form, is 
questioned by the Governor as he transitions from the narrative of the ‘powerless state’ to 
one that is the guardian of the British economy.  This shift is similar to that seen by the 
Chancellor of Exchequer, though the position of the Governor does not shift hands during 
this period, reinforcing the earlier statement that the particular individual is largely 
irrelevant for the purposes of this analysis.  
The 2006 speech is the most indicative of this, with the Governor stating “excessive 
regulation makes life difficult for us all”, and that the government’s role was to ensure a 
stable set of rules within which the markets can operate. This endorsement of the ‘light 
touch’ regulation doctrine is more indicative of a wider discursive trend that is to set 
imaginary ‘limits’ to government activity. As his future speeches state “government can’t 
save every job” and the year before that, “government can’t save every bank”. This principle 
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is summed in the statement “to their credit, business people and politicians have not 
resisted changes to the structure of the British economy”, delegitimising government 
intervention whilst legitimising the growth of the investment banking sector as a natural 
market process that should not be stemmed but rather endorsed.  
By the onset of 2008 the Governor there is an noticeable shift in the character of 
speeches with the Governor reciting Robert Frost poem stating “some say the world will end 
in fire, some say in ice, but whichever it is, it won’t be nice” that is explained more 
exhaustively with “that non-inflationary consistently expansionary decade…has drawn to a 
close”. Notably – the Governor acknowledges the ‘crisis’ as a ‘crisis’ a year before the 
Chancellor does, however, characterising the financial crisis as a produce of a failure to 
“assess and price risk in the financial sector” though more attributable to the actions of 
American banks as well as rising energy and good prices. This pales in comparison to the 
criticisms levied in following years, with the Governor condemning the existence of ‘too big-
to fail’ investment banks as “sitting oddly with a market economy” and further stating that 
“some banks (are a) worse credit risk than some of their customers”. Where once the 
Governor celebrated growth of the industry in 2006, stating “few could have imagined how 
far its domain would extend…no longer a single Square Mile but a banker’s dozen” to his 
solemn 2009 statement, “the financial sector became too big”. These comments reflect a 
discursive repudiation of the previous joyful government language in discussing the growth 
and successes of investment banking. 
The above mentioned speeches by the Chancellor of Exchequer and Governor of the 
Bank of England are utilised annually to outline the policies of government and the 
regulator, the tone and character of the rhetoric used reflects the discourse being 
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disseminated by some of the most senior officials in government. As these speeches are 
often drafted from government policy and reflective of wider policy goals, they are 
emblematic of wider official government stances toward investment banks.  From 2006 to 
2011, the discourse engaged in those speeches changes due to the crisis. The language of 
confidence in investment banks, the need for stability in regulation and celebration of 
banking achievements dissipates in favour of acknowledging a crisis in banking and 
regulatory culture. This is a significant aspect of the overall discursive struggle for legitimacy 
that investment banks engage in over this period.  
In Society: Public Discourse and Perceptions of Legitimacy  
 
The character of public discourse surrounding investment bank’s activities and the 
perception of legitimacy amongst the general public are integral in defining the overall 
discursive position of the sector. The following section will analyse public discourse in the 
form of newspapers, and public opinion polling to better understand investment banks and 
their perceived legitimacy, so as to determine how this form of power has altered since the 
Global Financial Crisis.  
In Society: Newspaper Representations of Investment Banks 
 
An integral part of Britain’s civil society is its newspapers that are a trusted source of news 
and opinion by certain segments of society. The most common format of serious news is the 
daily broadsheet paper that cumulatively  have a circulation of ten million copies a day 
amounting to one in five British adults, as such, these papers form a significant share of 
public discourse in the country on a wide range of issues. Three of the largest non-tabloid 
daily papers are ‘The Daily Telegraph’, ‘The Times’ and ‘The Guardian’, representing a daily 
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readership of four million three hundred thousand individuals, with each paper having 
relatively equal readerships (AC Research 2011).  
These audiences however tend to differ politically as do the paper’s general 
persuasion, ‘The Daily Telegraph’ having a readership that votes overwhelmingly 
conservative, ‘The Times’ having a readership reflective of the electorate at large and ‘The 
Guardian’ having an overwhelmingly progressive audience8 (IPOS Mori 2010). Through the 
analysis of articles published by these papers from 2006 to 2010, this section will outline the 
change in discourse regarding investment banks over this period. What analysis of these 
newspapers indicates is that from 2006 – 2010 there was a major shift in public discourse 
toward a tougher more critical stance toward investment banks, despite aforesaid attempts 
by the investment banks to manipulate the media and re-frame public discourse.   
From studying all reporting on investment banks by these three major papers, two 
years prior to the crisis (2006), the year of the crisis (2008) and two years after the crisis 
(2010), this research reveals the expected trend that discourse has come to turn quickly 
against the industry. Excluding purely factual or neutral reporting, this analysis separates five 
hundred and seventy seven articles by the aforementioned papers into negative and positive 
articles based on the tone of the article, its subject matters and whether or not criticisms are 
levied at the investment banking sector and its holistic legitimacy. What this study 
demonstrates and as illustrated in the following chart  is that as expected, the number of 
negative articles relating to investment banks rose dramatically during the global financial 
crisis, regardless of the political leanings of the paper itself;  
                                                           
8
 By voting intervention, The Daily Telegraph (61% Con, 15% Lab, 15% L-Dem) The Guardian (5% Con, 44% Lab, 
37% L-Dem) The Times (40% Con, 25% Lab, 29% L-Dem)  
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Figure 6. Reporting by Newspapers Relating to Investment Banking 
Notably the progressive leaning The Guardian begins from a higher baseline and 
rising to close to ninety per cent negative and maintains that level until 2010, mainstream 
The Times sees a larger spike and maintains a similar level high level. The Daily Telegraph’s 
highest point does not match the other two papers and the decline in negative reporting two 
years from the financial crisis. Regardless the Global Financial Crisis saw newspapers of all 
political persuasions and those traditionally friendly toward the sector take a far more 
critical tone toward Britain’s investment banks. Most notably there is no significant increase 
in the number of articles on investment banks during the Global Financial Crisis, suggesting 
that the discursive struggle is over existing print space in newspapers – a struggle which saw 
a significant reduction in investment banks discursive power as the major progressive and 
mainstream newspapers, and to a lesser extent the conservative paper of repute, turned 
against the sector.    
The above said shift in discourse can be understood in greater depth by analysing the 
tone and content of articles published during the 2006 – 2010 period. As the crisis began in 
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September and the ‘bonus season’ begins in this period, the September to December period 
poses the most attractive sample of months within which to analyse articles in 2008, as a 
representation of crisis year report, and the same period in 2006 and 2010 as representative 
of pre and post crisis discourse by the three major newspapers.  This section of serves to 
explain, illustrate and elaborate on earlier finding of a major discursive shift against 
investment banks over this period and characterise the changes in newspaper’s discourse. 
In the left-leaning Guardian there is a significant level of negative reporting regarding 
investment banks in September – December 2006. The Guardian levels several criticisms at 
investment banks pertaining to the treatment of minorities, women, union disputes as well 
as the now infamous ‘bonus culture’. Most notable is The Guardian’s blistering attacks on 
hiring policies within investment banks in which Guardian reporters allege “women remain 
an exotic choice of colleague for the middle-class white men” (Hangreaves 2006) in the 
sector and give light to the low levels of senior female executives in the sector.  These same 
criticisms of the investment banks were not echoed by the other two major papers in the 
same period. With the advent of the crisis and afterwards, the Guardian refocuses its 
attention on the investment banks abuse “of the public purse” (The Guardian 2010) while 
also criticising bonuses and salaries, querying “is any man worth five million pounds?” (The 
Guardian 2008) while further describing some incentives as “sophisticated tax avoidance” 
(Bowers 2008). The Guardian poises the banks as illegitimately adversarial to British society, 
pitting them in contrast to the concerns of ethnic minorities, women, unions and forcing 
“small investors and consumers to swallow their losses”. In the words of The Guardian, 
investment banks are discursively designed as “more unpopular than a blood sucking 
vampire squid” (Wood 2010).  
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In contrast the conservative The Daily Telegraph constructs a very different image of 
investment banks and their role within British society. Articles in the September – December 
2006 period echo a triumphant investment banking industry, illustrated as the standard 
bearer of British industry. The Daily Telegraph seems to rejoice with the sector in its 
successes, using terms such as ‘coup in China’ and outlining new profit sheets and increases 
in staff levels. Most notably, those few criticisms that are levied at the sector are aimed at 
foreign investment banks. Over this period The Daily Telegraph creates a larger-than-life 
image of senior bankers in its weekly ‘Movers & Shakers – City Sandwich Column’, outlining 
their earnings, lifestyles and extravagant parties in a similar manner to that of celebrities. 
The banks and its employees are constructed as enviable and successful, as opposed to The 
Guardian’s approach toward the sector in these months. With the GFC, the nature of 
discourse changes, while investment banks are no longer idolised, The Daily Telegraph is 
more critical of government, regulators as well as foreign owned banks Goldman Sachs & 
Lehman brothers than toward British sector. By 2010, these articles quickly change to a 
rhetoric espousing self-control and self-regulation as the “banks need to put its own house 
in order” (Walter 2010) by “declining millions of pounds in bonuses” (Warmer 2010) and 
internally controlling risky behaviour. 
What is clear is that the shifts in discursive power are not apparent at either end of 
the political spectrum; rather, it is a struggle over the rhetoric of the centre. While the Daily 
Telegraph and the Guardian in reality remain largely as supportive and critical of the 
investment banks throughout the crisis, it is The Times that reflects the broader British 
opinion that changes more irreversibly. Put simply, articles in The Times resemble The Daily 
Telegraph in 2006, with a celebratory attitude toward investment banks and their 
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achievements, and end in 2010, with a level of cynicism and criticalness toward the sector 
that is akin to The Guardian. This is apparent in the language used in articles, with the jovial 
tone of early articles turning to cynicism with a sarcastic “banker boss feels your pain” in 
response to the Goldman Sachs’ CEO forgoing a multi-million dollar bonus (Griffins 2010).  
This discursive shift from the centre of the British press toward investment banks reflects a 
wider change in public discourse. The Global Financial Crisis saw bodies that were relatively 
supportive or at worst apathetic toward investment banking turn completely against the 
sector. This new found cynicism toward the industry was directed at a number of activities 
perceived as illegitimate, including the bonus culture and excessive risk taking. Despite 
attempts by investment banks to exercise discursive power and frame discourse after the 
Global Financial crisis, over this period there is a noticeable deterioration in the discursive 
strength of investment banks, as illustrated in print-media aspect of public discourse.  
In Society: A Crisis in Confidence for Investment Banks  
 
 As Fuchs argues, the singularly most important aspect of discursive power is the creation 
and shaping of legitimacy. Investment banks must maintain the perception in the eyes of the 
public that their business model and activities are legitimate to continue to do so 
unrestricted by government regulation or societal censure. Discursive power lies in the 
ability to convince individuals of this and to shape and move discussion in a favourable 
manner. Polling information from a diversity of sources indicates that this aforementioned 
legitimacy does not exist and that in recent years, after the Global Financial Crisis, the British 
public has a complete lack of confidence in their investment banking institutions. In this, the 
attempts by investment banks to exercise discursive power clearly have not changed the 
situation now faced by the industry, reinforcing the evidence from politicians, newspapers 
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and regulators that public discourse has turned firmly against investment banks due to the 
financial crisis.  
The most recent polling by YouGov of 2,118 sampled British adults, a statistically 
significant and weighted selection, suggests that in April – May 2011, a wide range of 
investment banks principal activities were perceived to be illegitimate and should be 
legislated against (YouGov 2011). When asked the question “Politicians need to do more to 
prevent irresponsible lending” some seventy six per cent agreed, while only eight per cent 
disagreed. Likewise, when asked if they felt “Banks lent irresponsibly to some people before 
the credit crunch” a larger proportion, eight four per cent agreed, while only four per cent 
disagreed – that is within the margin of error for the poll itself. When asked if banks could be 
trusted in the future, forty-six per cent or close to half of respondents disagreed, while only 
one in five responded positively (See appendix i for raw aggregate polling).  This polling 
reveals that as of 2011, there is a great level of mistrust with Britain’s investment banking 
sector, where many of the bank’s primary activities are perceived to be illegitimate. The 
above said polling data reflecting shifts in public sentiment tend to be similar to the 
discursive shift in newspapers. While a minority of individuals continue to accept investment 
banks as legitimate institutions, the majority of the United Kingdom’s adult population have 
come to be highly critical of the bank’s activities in the post-crisis period.  
A Harris-Financial Times poll of 1,347 British adults, adjusted to be demographically 
proportional, in January of 2010 reveals in greater detail the perception of illegitimacy, 
unpopularity and distrust of investment banks within British society. It is shown that Britons 
identified investment banks, more than any other group, as “primarily responsible” for the 
Global Financial Crisis (Harris-Financial Times 2010). Furthermore fifty per cent of 
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respondents favoured the “breaking up” of investment banks perceived as too big to fail, 
only six per cent of respondents or one in sixteen reacted negatively to the proposition. This 
lack of confidence in the financial sector is reflected in the majority of major investment 
banks being more mistrusted than trusted by the respondent group.  As the investment 
banks are perceived to be illegitimate, so too are the extreme earnings by the investment 
banks and their employees, with Britons favouring the taxation and capping of banker’s 
bonuses overwhelmingly in this poll and with far more conviction than supporting taxation 
on other high earning professions. These figures are further reinforced by similar polling by 
Com Res of a representative sample of 2,030 British adults in September 2011 that finds 
some seventy per cent of Britons feel that government should implement a swathe of new 
financial regulation, as they hold investment banks primarily responsible for the financial 
crisis  (ITN 2011) (see appendix i for formatted YouGov, Harris-Financial and ComRes-ITN poll 
results and method). 
Concluding Statements  
 
While investment banking firms have attempted to exercise discursive power, public 
discourse has clearly shifted to be more critical of investment banks, as the general tone of 
government and society reflects a growing concern with the bank’s legitimacy and 
unpopularity. While the industry has implemented a textbook strategy of exercising 
discursive power, this has not been able to shape public discussion on regulation and the 
legitimacy of investment banking. This is reflected in the discursive shift of government, 
emblemised in the rhetoric of key politicians and regulators, as well as in newspapers - a 
mainstay of public discourse. The tendency toward being more critical toward investment 
banks is one that is demonstrable and the implications for the bank’s discursive strength are 
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clear. These trends correlate strongly with the flagging poll numbers of investment banks 
that reflect a people that have a negative view toward investment banks, their activities and 
feel that government should regulate. This is the ultimate indication that the discursive 
strength of investment banks has become depleted since the Global Financial Crisis.  
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
 
Lifting the Shroud on Business Power and Government   
 
This thesis sought to deconstruct the power relationship between investment banks and 
government, not prior to the Global Financial Crisis that is so often discussed, but rather to 
understand whether and how this relationship has changed in the aftermath of the crisis. As 
such, by analysing the shifts in the structural, instrumental and discursive elements of this 
power, and based on a wide array of qualitative and quantitative data; a few assertions can 
be made regarding the nature of the power relationship between the United Kingdom’s 
government and investment banks that will be outlined herein.   
This thesis concludes that the different elements of business power have undergone 
transformations since the financial crisis. The evidence brought forward in this thesis 
indicates that the structural significance of British investment banks have increased since the 
2007 meltdown, contrary to reports by many leading newspapers and academics. While in 
absolute terms there have been reductions in the economic prowess of these institutions, 
relative to the rest of the British economy, investment banks have seen their share of tax 
revenue, export earnings, labour force and other key indicators remain steady or increase. 
Schemes to ‘bailout’ the banks have further added to the structural power of the industry, 
by increasing government’s exposure to the long-term performance of banking assets.  
Likewise, in depth analysis of the instrumental power of Britain’s investment banks 
has yielded interesting findings. Particularly government regulators have been the subject of 
some reform since the Global Financial Crisis, with the Britain’s primary regulatory agency 
taking observable steps toward improving its ability to regulate independently of the 
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resources lent to it from investment banks. This has had mixed results, while the Authority 
has dramatically increased fines and some aspects of enforcement, the ‘soft touch culture’ it 
is infamous for is testament to the instrumental power of the banking industry. What is clear 
is that investment banks have, since the financial crisis, launched a concerted campaign to 
influence policy-makers through political donations and intense lobbying. Since the financial 
meltdown, ‘loans’ offered to political parties and direct contributions have increased while 
industry lobbyists are afforded unmatched access to many senior cabinet members in a bid 
to exert private influence over the decision making process.  
 From the aforementioned results, it is likely that the structural and instrumental 
elements of investment banking power have grown since the Global Financial Crisis. 
Discursively however, it would appear that investment banks have faced a crisis of legitimacy 
in the eyes of government and society. While the sector continually engages in a campaign 
of public relations in an attempt to mend their damaged reputation and shape the discursive 
environment, polling data indicates that investment banking is increasingly perceived as 
illegitimate and undesirable. Further, it is revealed that Britons blame the financial 
meltdown on these institutions more than any other. This is reflected by an ever more 
critical press; with the politically centrist paper ‘The Times’, matching ‘The Guardians’ 
ordinarily critical and negative approach toward investment banks, indicating a discursive 
shift in the centre of society.  Likewise, senior government regulators and politicians reflect 
these discursive changes in their key-note annual addresses to the Mansion House Dinner, 
with the occasion turning from a congratulatory message to Britain’s investment bankers 
into a lambasting of the banker’s behaviour.   
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 In deconstructing the power relationship between the United Kingdom’s government 
and investment banks, it is fair to conclude that this relationship has changed as a result of 
the crisis. Elements of this power, particularly perceptions of legitimacy, have decreased, 
while the structural and instrumental components of this power have relatively increased 
compared to the pre-crisis period. In analysing these separate elements of business power, 
one can better understand the transformation of relations with government that have 
occurred as a result of the financial crisis.  
Practical Implications and Future Research 
 
  In recent times the British government has become a process of reviewing its system 
of financial regulation toward the eventual ends of preventing future financial meltdowns. 
Many of these regulatory reforms touch on issues discussed in this thesis, such as the 
relationship between investment banks and government regulators, or the role of political 
donations in shaping regulatory outcomes. This public discussion seeks to readdress the role 
of investment banks in the British economy and whether financial services can truly form the 
engines of economic growth. While this paper cannot claim to predict or completely explain 
future government action based its analysis of investment banking power, it can serve to 
assist in explaining the nature of future regulatory reforms or a lack thereof.  
 While the regulatory reforms emanating from the Global Financial Crisis, and the 
interaction between government, business and society in shaping those regulations would 
pose an interesting opportunity for further research, there are also other prospects to build 
upon the research outlined in this paper. This thesis addresses the relationship between 
government and investment banks in one of the two major financial centres of the world, 
with the United States being the other major locality that is most often associated with the 
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financial crisis. Future research could possibly analyse the change in power relations 
between the U.S government and its investment banks, and compare those findings with 
that of this thesis. There are a myriad of avenues for further research that may build upon or 
utilise the findings in this paper to advance academic discussion and understandings of 
government, business and power. 
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Appendix a 
 
Sourced from the Turner Review, the Bank of England and HM Treasury, the above graphs reveal the 
trends by investment banks to engage in high risk activity, especially regarding the mortgage market. 
Investment banks are shown to increasingly leverage less, as displayed in Figure 3, more banks lent 
more capital with less liquid assets to absorb losses, leading to the highly precarious solvency of 
investment firms.  
(Turner, Adair. The Turner Review. Discussion Paper, London: Financial Services Authority, 2009.) 
  
Loans made by investment banks to UK political parties from 2002 
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Appendix c 
The following is a list of known investment bank lobbyists recruited from the ranks of political and 
government officials that reinforces the notion of a ‘revolving door’ between government and the 
industry that may allow the banks a great level of access and influence;  
 Howell James – Appointed as Corporate Affairs Director by Barclays after three months earlier working 
as “the second highest paid” senior government media advisor  
 Sumantra  Prasad – Recruited by Lloyds as a public policy manager after working for the Financial 
Services Authority policy division 
 Further, key members of the Conservative Party MP Francis Maude, as well as Labour’s Patricia Hewitt 
sit on Barclay’s advisory board.  
 Lord Digby Jones, Minister for UK Trade and Investment 07/08 –senior advisor to Barclays Capital 
06/07 
 Sir David Arculus – Chairman of the Cabinet Office’s Better Regulation Task Force, whilst being a 
Barclay’s director  
 Sir Ander Likierman, Barclays director since 2004, was until 2008, also a Direct of the Bank of England  
 Rachel Lomax, member of Bank of England’s monetary policy committee, now a HSBC director 
 Lord Nicholas Stern, HSBC advisor, formerly permanent secretary at HM Treasury 
 JP Morgan retains Tony Blair as a consultant and senior advisor in 2008 
 The following diagram created by Spin watch outlines the connections between Barclays and 
Government 
Spinwatch. An Inside Job: A Snapshot of Political Schmoozing by The City. NGO Report, London: Spinwatch, 2011. 
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Appendix d 
TheCityUK Board of Directors – Composition by Organisation  
 TheCityUK Advisory Council  
 Role  Name  Organisation 
 Chairman  Stuart Popham  Vice Chairman of EMEA Banking, Citi 
 Deputy Chairman  Stuart Fraser  Chairman of Policy, City of London Corporation 
 Chief Executive  Chris Cummings  TheCityUK 
 Chairman:  
 Overseas Promotion Committee  Robert Gray 
 Chairman, Debt Finance  & Advisory, 
HSBC 
 Chairman:  
 Domestic Promotion Committee  Steve Perry  Executive Vice President, Visa Europe 
 Chairman:  
 International Regulatory Strategy Group  Andre Villeneuve 
 Non-Executive Director, Lloyd's Franchise 
Board 
 Member  Elizabeth Corley  CEO, Allianz Global Investors Europe 
 Member  Sir Tom Harris  Vice Chairman - Capital Markets, Standard Chartered 
 Member  Sean McGovern  Director & General Counsel, Lloyd's of London 
 Member  Harvey McGrath  Chairman, Prudential 
 Member  Dame Clara Furse 
 Non-Executive Director, Nomura International 
and  
 Legal & General 
 Member  Sushil Saluja  Managing Partner, Accenture 
 Member  Nick Studer  Partner, Oliver Wyman 
 Member  Jeremy Wilson  Vice Chairman, Barclays Corporate 
 Observer  Mark Boleat  Deputy Chairman of Policy, City of London Corporation 
 Observer  Anthony Browne  Policy Director, Mayor of London 
 Observer  Edward Oakden  Managing Director, UK Trade & Investment 
 President  Lord Mayor of London  City of London Corporation 
 Chairman  Sir Win Bischoff  Chairman, Lloyds Banking Group 
 Deputy Chairman  Lord Peter Levene  Chairman, Lloyd's of London 
 Member  Marcus Agius  Chairman, Barclays 
 Member  Kurt Björklund  Managing Partner, Permira Advisers 
 Member  Ana P Botín  CEO, Santander UK 
 Member  Lord Leon Brittan  Vice Chairman, UBS Investment Bank 
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 Member  David Cheyne  Senior Partner, Linklaters 
 Member  John Connolly  Senior Partner, Deloitte 
 Member  John Cridland  Director General, CBI 
 Member  Ludovic de Montille  CEO, BNP Paribas UK 
 Member  Michael Evans  Chairman, Hargreaves Lansdown 
 Member  Douglas Flint  Group Chairman, HSBC Holdings 
 Member  Katherine Garrett-Cox  CEO, Alliance Trust 
 Member  Mark Garvin  Chairman, JP Morgan UK 
 Member  Chris Gibson-Smith  Chairman, London Stock Exchange 
 Member  Roger Gifford  Head of London, SEB Private Banking 
 Member  Martin Gilbert  CEO, Aberdeen Asset Management 
 Member  Richard Gillingwater  Dean, Cass Business School 
 Member  Richard Gnodde  Co-Chief Executive, Goldman Sachs International 
 Member  Colin Grassie  CEO, Deutsche Bank UK 
 Member  John Griffith-Jones  Managing Partner, KPMG 
 Member  Gerry Grimstone  Chairman, Standard Life 
 Member  Sir Philip Hampton  Chairman, RBS 
 Member  Andy Haste  Group Chief Executive, RSA 
 Member  Geoffrey Howe  Chairman, Nationwide 
 Member  George Iacobescu  CEO, Canary Wharf 
 Member  Angela Knight  CEO, British Bankers Association 
 Member  James Leigh-Pemberton  CEO, Credit Suisse 
 Member  Alastair Lyons  Chairman, Admiral Insurance 
 Member  Peter Mann  CEO, Skandia UK 
 Member  Lord Colin Marshall  Chairman, Nomura Europe 
 Member  William J Mills  CEO, Citigroup EMEA 
 Member  Donald Moore  Chairman, Morgan Stanley 
 Member  Guy Morton  Senior Partner, Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer 
 Member  Andy Baldwin  Managing Director, Ernst & Young 
 Member  Joe Plumeri  CEO, Willis 
 Member  Ian Powell  Managing Partner, PricewaterhouseCoopers 
 Member  Lord Sharman  Chairman, Aviva 
 Member  John Stewart  Chairman, Legal & General 
 Member  Mark Tennant  Chairman, Scottish Financial Enterprise 
 Member  Bob Wigley  Operating Partner, European Financial Services, Advent International 
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Appendix e 
The following is the results and methodology of key polling by YouGov, Harris-Financial Times and 
ITN regarding investment banking in the United Kingdom  
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Harris – Financial Times Polling Raw Aggregates
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ITN-Com Res Aggregate Results 
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